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When individuals tell stories from their own lives, they do so by constructing and interpreting 
these stories in a way that places them within the overarching structure of their moral values. 
Though preserving one’s moral identity as a “good person” is an important goal, individuals 
often act in ways that are self-serving or cause harm to others. One way that individuals maintain 
a positive moral identity following immoral behaviors may be to dampen down their ascriptions 
of their own intentionality for said behaviors—thus aligning one’s memories for the event with 
one’s moral code. Across eight studies, I find that this alignment process leads to predictable 
biases in both event perception and autobiographical memory. In studies 1 and 2, I show that 
immoral events are construed at a higher level than non-moral events, and that immoral 
behaviors that individuals have performed themselves are construed at a lower level than 
immoral behaviors that they have not. The final five studies examine the perception of moral 
events through the structure of the moral dyad, which posits that moral situations are comprised 
of “agents” (those with the capacity to harm others) and “patients” (those who are harmed as a 
result the agent’s actions). Study 3 provides evidence that individuals are better able to recall 
moral patient events than moral agent events. Studies 4 through 6 examine the processes 
underlying this effect, and find that both event negativity and perceived intentionality impact 
memory recall for moral events. Studies 7 and 8 test a proposed mechanism for this effect: that 
agency increases feelings of psychological completeness for moral events
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
“How often do we tell our own life story? How often do we adjust, embellish, make sly cuts? 
And the longer life goes on, the fewer are those around to challenge our account, to remind us 
that our life is not our life, merely the story we have told about our life. Told to others, but—
mainly—to ourselves.”  
              -Julian Barnes, The Sense of An Ending 
 
 In 1991, President George Bush nominated federal circuit Judge Clarence Thomas to the 
Supreme Court of the United States. Following Thomas’s Senate confirmation hearings, a private 
FBI interview with Thomas’s former employee—Attorney Anita Hill—was leaked to the press. 
In the interview, Hill claimed that Thomas had sexually harassed her, asked her out on dates 
multiple times, suggested that the two watch pornography together, and made lewd comments 
about pubic hair in the workplace. Thomas’s version of events was notably different than Hill’s, 
he claimed to have never asked Hill out on a date, and further claimed that he considered Hill a 
friend that he had helped significantly at the outset of her career (Smolowe, 1991).  The obvious 
question is: who was lying? Clearly some version of these events transpired between Hill and 
Thomas, but both the nature of these events and the extent to which a moral violation (sexual 
harassment) occurred, remains unclear.  
 These types of viewpoint discrepancies in the narrative of events happens frequently, and 
particularly in the moral domain: BP CEO Tony Hayward referred to the amount of oil leaked 
into the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 as “relatively tiny” (The Guardian, 2010), Private Lynndie 
England—famous for abusing prisoners in the Abu Ghraib scandal—claims that the prisoners got 
 2 
the “better end of the deal” (NBC News, 2013), and recording artist Chris Brown claims to have 
blurry memories of assaulting his then-girlfriend the pop singer Rihanna (Rolling Stone, 2009). 
What is clear from these examples is that the role that an individual plays in a moral event has a 
powerful impact on how the event is interpreted, explained, and perhaps even recalled.   
A great deal of evidence suggests that our memories are imperfect representations of the 
past. How a memory is retold depends a great deal on the context of the retelling, and 
incorporates both present goals and updated information (Holland & Kensinger, 2011). One area 
where memory may be particularly altered is in how we think about and recollect 
autobiographical moral events. A great deal of literature has focused on how we make moral 
judgments about the immoral behaviors of others (Haidt, 2001; Greene et al., 2004; Kohlberg, 
1973). A number of factors influence judgment of others’ immoral or harmful behaviors, these 
include perceived intentionality on the part of the moral transgressor (Gray & Wegner, 2008; 
Ames & Fiske, 2013), whether the moral transgressor is an in-group member (Gino, Ayal, & 
Ariely, 2009), whether the harm was due to an action or an omission (Schaich-Borg et al., 2006), 
and if the harm involved physical contact (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). In contrast, 
relatively little work has examined how we evaluate moral events in our own lives (for a notable 
exception see: Escobedo & Adolphs, 2010).  
The research presented below expands on this previous work by showing that negativity, 
intentionality, and personal agency all impact how autobiographical moral events are construed 
and recalled. While we use perceived agency to evaluate the moral behaviors of others 
(Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006) exactly how personal agency impacts our perceptions and 
judgments of autobiographical moral events remains unexplored.  The primary goal of this 
research is to test the hypothesis that individuals think about and remember moral actions in 
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which they were agents—or in control of the outcome of the event—differently than they think 
about actions in which they lacked agency, and instead suffered the consequences of an agent’s 
actions. The studies below examine how we protect our own self-concept, how our memory 
serves this goal, and the precise mechanisms by which we may alter our autobiographical 
memories. 
Morality can be self-serving 
For most individuals, it is important to maintain a self-concept of being a moral person 
(Aquino & Reed, 2002). Prior research has shown that one way that individuals do this is by 
disregarding base-rate information when it comes to making predictions about their own moral 
behavior (Epley & Dunning, 2000). In one study, the researchers had undergraduate participants 
predict both how many daffodils they would purchase for charity at a later date and how many 
daffodils the average undergraduate would purchase. Individuals significantly overestimated the 
charitable behavior of their future selves—while 83% of participants said that they would 
purchase a daffodil, only 43% of participants actually did. Further, while participants predicted 
that, on average, they would purchase 2 daffodils, in actuality only 1.2 were purchased. Both of 
these numbers fell far short of the predicted number for the self, but are strikingly close to those 
predicted for the average undergraduate. Participants had predicted that only 56% of the student 
population would purchase a daffodil, and that those individuals would purchase, on average, 1.4 
daffodils each. These results are indicative of a biased process by which individuals think about 
their own moral behavior. While Epley and Dunning claim that these “holier than thou” beliefs 
are due to errors in self and social prediction, I offer another, complementary, explanation: that 
our sense of moral superiority is rooted in errors and biases in autobiographical memory.  
 4 
Goals lead to motivated memory. Memory distortion happens very frequently, as current 
goals can impact the perception and memory of emotional events in one’s life during both 
encoding and retrieval (Johnson & Sherman, 1990; Ochsner & Schacter, 2003; Levine & Safer, 
2002). Recalling an event doesn’t happen in a vacuum, and is subject to both motivational and 
cognitive processes that influence the quality and accuracy of what is recalled. How events are 
related to our current goals determines the nature of our initial emotional response and 
how/which cognitive processes will be used in remembering it (Ochsner & Schacter, 2003). 
Because individuals have a strong desire to maintain a positive moral identity, this motivation 
may guide reconstruction and retrieval of moral memories.   
Chapter 2 begins to explore this process by focusing on the construal of immoral 
behaviors. I first focus on how the performance of an immoral behavior changes the way in 
which the immoral action itself is perceived. Across two studies, I examine how moral content 
(Study 1) and personal history (Study 2) impact level identification of moral behaviors. By level 
identification, I mean the extent to which individuals identify actions and behaviors as being 
relatively abstract or concrete (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). For example, an immoral behavior 
like looking off of someone else’s test can be categorized abstractly as “cheating on an exam” or 
it can be categorized concretely as “checking someone else’s answer”. As abstract 
categorizations tend to be more affectively charged and have more personal meaning (Critcher & 
Ferguson, 2011), I predict that individuals who have performed immoral behaviors themselves 
will be less likely to categorize them abstractly. This low level construal for personal immoral 
actions is self-serving, and allows us to “clean up” our memory for the times in which we acted 
immorally by maintaining the view that we have not violated moral rules.   
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One efficient way that individuals can both act immorally and preserve a positive moral 
identity seems to be by distorting memory for the times they agentically did something wrong. 
Two ways that individuals can do this include underplaying the frequency and negativity of these 
events.  Chapter 3 builds on this idea by focusing on moral typecasting (Gray & Wegner, 2009), 
which claims that moral events are comprised of a dyadic structure, wherein entities known as 
“agents” (those with the capacity to perform immoral acts) harm individuals known as “patients” 
(those who experience the outcomes of the agent’s behaviors) (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). 
When individuals are recalling moral events in their lives, I predict that moral patient events will 
be considered more emotionally impactful than moral agent events. As both emotion and arousal 
have been shown to influence memory intensity for autobiographical life events (Phelps & 
Sharot, 2008; Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004), these processes will bias memory such that 
moral patient events will be better recalled than moral agent events. Across four studies, I show 
that perceived moral status (agent/patient) influences memory for moral events, such that 
individuals are able to recall more events in which they were a moral patient than those in which 
they were a moral agent (Study 3), that moral patient experiences are remembered as more 
negative than moral agent experiences and thus are more easily recalled (Study 4), that this 
relationship between negativity and memory intensity is moderated by the extent to which the 
moral agent’s actions were viewed as intentional (Study 5), and that increases in perceived agent 
intentionality are linked to more accurate recall of moral events (Study 6).  
Chapter 4 looks at a potential mechanism that may underlie the tendency for moral 
patient events to be better recalled than moral agent events: the relationship between moral status 
(agent/patient) and psychological completeness. Tasks that are considered incomplete or 
unfinished are better recalled than those that were completed (Zeigarnik, 1935; Savitsky, 
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Medvec, & Gilovich, 1997). I predict that moral patients and moral agents will diverge in the 
extent to which they feel that moral events are truly over or complete. I hypothesize that this is 
due to two factors: the extent to which amends are made, and the extent to which the causes of 
the event are understood. As agents are more in control of both of these factors (they both cause 
moral events and are the ones who choose to make amends), I expect that agents will consider 
the event to be more psychologically complete than will patients. In study 7, I test this 
hypothesis, and find that agents do indeed feel that moral events are more psychologically 
complete than do patients, and that this effect is mediated by the extent to which amends were 
made. In study 8, I propose and test a model wherein the effect of moral status on psychological 
completeness is mediated by both the extent to which amends were made and the extent to which 
causes feel understood, operating in parallel. Taken together, these studies suggest that personal 
agency impacts how immoral behaviors are mentally represented, how they are remembered, and 
the extent to which they feel psychologically complete. 
Identifying action 
 Any action that an individual performs can be thought about in multiple ways varying 
along a continuum from concrete to abstract. For example, drinking a morning cup of coffee can 
be described concretely as holding a warm cup or bringing a hot beverage to one’s lips. 
However, to a sleep-deprived individual who has recently become the parent of a newborn, 
drinking a morning cup of coffee can be seen as a necessary revitalization, perhaps shortly 
behind breathing and eating in terms of importance. Thus coffee drinking, like any action, can be 
represented at different levels of abstraction, ranging from relatively more concrete to more 
abstract.  Where an action is placed on this continuum is based on a multitude of factors, 
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including the goals that the individual has at the time, the meaning with which they imbue the 
action, and individual differences in personal agency (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989).  
This process is the primary focus of action identification theory (Wegner & Vallacher, 
1986; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; Wegner et al., 1984), which rests on the idea that every action 
can be categorized within lower-level (more concrete) or higher-level (more abstract) identities. 
This distinction between high level and low level can be understood by thinking about the 
endogenous qualities of the action itself: low-level identifications answer the question of “how” 
an action is performed and high-level identifications answer the question of “why” an action is 
performed (Trope & Liberman, 2003). Or, to return to the coffee example, how one drinks coffee 
is by bringing the cup to one’s lips and why one drinks coffee is to feel revitalized. The former 
would be considered a relatively low level identification and the latter would be considered a 
relatively high level identification.  
Individuals tend to categorize their own actions at a higher level than at a lower level, 
likely due to an increased focus on the consequences, motivations, and meanings of their 
behaviors (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). These high level identifications serve to make everyday 
actions more fulfilling and worthwhile—while tooth brushing can be thought of as rubbing 
bristles across one’s teeth, it is both more satisfying and more in line with the reasons why teeth 
are brushed to instead think about the behavior as “maintaining dental health.” As acting morally 
is often an important part of one’s identity, it seems plausible that immoral behaviors (e.g. 
cheating, lying) will tend to be construed at a higher level than non-moral behaviors (e.g. plant 
watering, list-making). However, once an immoral action has been performed, individuals might 
strip the act of affective and personal significance by instead construing it at a lower level. For 
example, for a student who has looked off of someone else’s paper, it may be less threatening to 
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their moral identity to identify the action as “checking someone’s answer” rather than “cheating 
on a test.” In Chapter 2, I test this idea, and show that immoral behaviors tend to be categorized 
at a higher level than non-moral behaviors (study 1), but that this tendency is diminished when 
individuals are categorizing immoral actions that they themselves have completed (study 2).  
Determining agency 
In order for any action to exist, much less be characterized, there must first exist an agent 
who performs said action. For the purposes of the research presented below, agents are those 
who have the capacity to act—for an agent, action is inevitable. This means that inaction (i.e. 
omission) on the part of an agent is the performance of an action in and of itself (Himma, 2009). 
For example, if an agent chooses not to jump in front of the subway to save a child, this is as 
much of an action as choosing to do so. However, not all behaviors qualify as agentic actions. 
Some have suggested that agentic actions are only those behaviors that are “intentional under 
some description” (Davidson, 1980, essay 3; Wilson & Shpall, 2012). By intentionality, I mean 
having the capacity for mental states that are about something else—that is, a belief, desire, or 
volition to both want and/or achieve a goal (Himma, 2009). This distinction, intentionality in 
some form, separates out events like heartbeats or pupil dilation from more goal-directed 
behavior like watching an entire season of “House of Cards” on a beautiful Sunday afternoon. 
The presence of intentionality in action is an important one, as intention acts as a signifier to both 
mental state and to an individual’s dispositions (Epley & Waytz, 2009). In addition, perceived 
intentionality is one of the primary factors that determines moral blame or responsibility (Rim, 
Hansen, & Trope, 2013; Alicke, 2000). 
While assessing intention is important, an individual must first assess if an action is 
rooted in a mind that is capable of forming and acting upon intentions. As agents move 
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throughout the world, they do so in the presence of other individuals. Often, these individuals are 
themselves agents, capable of performing actions based on intentions or desires; however, some 
entities (e.g. adults) possess more of the characteristics of agency than others (e.g. infants). Some 
have suggested that all entities are evaluated on two dimensions: 1) Conscious experience, or the 
capacity to experience emotion, pain, and body states, and 2) intentional agency, or the ability to 
exhibit control, act morally, plan for the future, and experience conscious thought (Gray, Gray, 
& Wegner, 2007). While entities vary along these dimensions in a continuum, the two 
dimensions of mind perception match nicely with the classic Aristotelian separation into 
individuals as agents (those high in perceived agency) and patients (those high in perceived 
experience) (Gray & Wegner, 2009; Eshleman, 2014). These dimensions of mind perception also 
map onto assessments of moral blame and punishment—individuals report that entities that are 
high in agency deserve more blame for harms and entities that are high in experience would be 
more unpleasant to harm (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007).  
 Moral Agents and Moral Patients  
An extension of mind perception occurs in the moral domain, wherein agents not only 
have the capacity to act, but also do so within a moral framework. Moral agency is complex; it 
involves not only being responsible for any action that occurred, but also possessing some 
knowledge of right and wrong (Eshleman, 2014). This is why the brutal murder of a child by a 
fully functional adult is considered to be more morally blameworthy than if an out-of-control dog 
had performed the same action. Rational adults are expected to have moral knowledge, and to 
use this knowledge when forming intentions and pursuing goals. Violations of moral norms by 
rational agents are thus met with more blame and punishment (Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Salovey, 
2003).  
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Some have suggested that most moral situations can be split into a dyadic structure, one 
that involves a moral agent (the person that acts morally or immorally) and a moral patient (the 
person who experiences the consequences of the agent’s actions) (Gray & Wegner, 2009; Gray, 
Waytz, & Young, 2012). Gray and Wegner (2009) claim that while these two roles (agent and 
patient) are fluid in practice, they are viewed as mutually exclusive within the realm of moral 
judgment; a process they term moral typecasting. In one study, they showed that agency and 
patiency have an inverse relationship, such that when an individual is perceived to have more 
agentic characteristics (e.g. control), they are also perceived to have less patient characteristics 
(e.g. they would feel less pain when harmed). In another study, they isolated this inverse 
relationship to the moral domain, showing that increases in perceived moral agency, but not 
agency more generally, decreases perceptions of patiency. In a third study, they looked at the 
causal relationship between moral agency and patiency. In this study, participants were given a 
scenario about two fictional characters: Michael and Jeffrey. The researchers manipulated the 
extent to which Michael and Jeffrey possessed typical agent and typical patient characteristics. 
For example, in one scenario Jeffrey is described as being genetically less sensitive to pain and 
Michael is described as being more sensitive to pain. They then presented participants with 
scenarios in which both Michael and Jeffrey had stolen a car. Participants then assessed which of 
the two individuals should be held as more responsible for the crime. The results showed that 
participants reported that the individual who had been described with characteristically fewer 
patient qualities (i.e. was less able to feel pain) was held to be more responsible for stealing the 
car. Thus, his lack of patiency led to an implicit increased perception of agency. In follow-up 
studies they also showed that the effects of perceived agency and patiency are long-lasting, such 
that being cast as a moral agent in one scenario leads to increased perceptions of moral agency 
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(and decreased perceptions of moral patiency) in future moral scenarios. Finally, they also 
demonstrated that individuals “fill in” parts of the dyad when none exist, and that individuals are 
more willing to allocate more pain to agents because they are seen as being less sensitive to pain, 
and thus are more able to withstand it.  
Chapter 3 builds upon this foundation of the moral dyad, and extends it to 
autobiographical memories for moral events. A relative paucity of literature in moral judgment 
has looked at how individuals examine and consider moral events in their own lives, and whether 
one’s role in the moral dyad, referred to here as “moral status”, shapes the quality and memory 
of one’s moral experiences. As adults are capable of being both moral agents and moral patients, 
if they have experienced a moral event in their lives, they have experienced being an agent 
and/or being a patient. Across four studies, I examine the differences between memories for 
events in which one was a moral agent or a moral patient.  Specifically, I show that individuals 
can recall more moral patient events than moral agent events, that this ease of recall is mediated 
by the negativity of the event, that agent intentionality moderates the relationship between moral 
status (patient/agent) and memory intensity, and that increases in perceived agent intentionality 
are related to increases in overall memory accuracy.  
Emotion and moral memory 
 While motivation certainly plays a role in the biased recall of moral memory, I suggest 
that there are also cognitive processes at work that lead to this effect. Emotional events retain 
their significance for longer periods of time than non-emotional events; they are recollected and 
rehearsed more frequently and memories for these events are reported as being more intense 
(Talarico & Rubin, 2003). In the research presented below, I suggest that as moral patiency is 
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characterized by the experience of emotion, moral patient events are more emotionally intense 
than moral agent events, and hence are better remembered.  
Moral memory and psychological completeness  
Another factor that may influence how negative moral events are remembered is whether 
the event feels psychologically complete. By psychologically complete, I mean the extent to 
which the event feels finished or an individual has a sense of closure. When events are not 
psychologically complete, they tend to “stick” with us. This feeling is better known as the 
Zeigarnik effect, or the tendency to recall interrupted tasks more than uninterrupted tasks 
(Zeigarnik, 1935). In the classic Zeigarnik study, participants were given a series of tasks, but 
half of the tasks were interrupted before they could be completed. The researchers found that 
participants remembered the interrupted tasks better than the tasks that they had finished. This 
effect is likely driven by the amount of attention that we give interrupted events, which may 
cause them to take up more of our mental space.  
The effect can even operate on the implicit level. In one study, Bargh and colleagues 
(2001) primed an implicit performance goal by having participants complete a word search 
puzzle that either included words related to high-performance (e.g. compete, succeed) or neutral 
words (e.g. turtle, staple). Following the priming task, half of the participants completed a task 
that had an achievement component (solving word search puzzles), while the other half of the 
participants completed a delay task that did not have an achievement component (filling out 
one’s family tree). Participants in the interruption condition (those who completed the delay task) 
then completed the task with the achievement component (the word search task). The researchers 
hypothesized that this delay would act as an interruption of implicit goal pursuit, and would 
increase the strength of the high-performance goal.  This was exactly what they found—
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participants who had been primed with an achievement goal and who had completed a delay task 
first outperformed participants in the other three conditions at the word search task.  
This nagging feeling of “unfinished business” has been shown to underlie negative 
affective experiences such as regret. Savitsky, Medvec, and Gilovich (1997) found that 
rumination over the psychologically incomplete underlies differences in the cognitive availability 
of regretful actions and inactions. In the first study, participants made a choice between which 
regret they thought about more frequently: a time that they had acted, or a time that they had 
refrained from acting. The majority of participants (60.5%) indicated that they more frequently 
thought about their regretted inaction than their regretted action. In the second study, they 
showed that this increased rumination made regrets of inaction easier to recall. In the third study, 
they expanded upon these results, and showed that regrets of inaction that feel open-ended are 
those that are ruminated upon the most. Taken together, these results potentially show that 
actions that feel unfinished or incomplete stay with us, and become part of the narrative that we 
construct about our lives.  
 In Chapter 4, I examine the role that psychological completeness may play in memory 
biases for moral events. I hypothesize that moral patient events will feel significantly more 
psychologically incomplete than moral agent events due to two factors: 1) the extent to which 
amends are made, and 2) the extent to which causes feel understood. Prior research supports this 
hypothesis, in one study, researchers found that the victims of harmful events perceive them to 
be more open than do the perpetrators, but this effect is reduced significantly if the event has 
been forgiven (Zechmeister & Romero, 2002). In addition, individuals tend to focus on 
unexpected outcomes more than expected outcomes (Clary & Tesser, 1983), thus, patients—who 
may not have been expecting outcome—may spend more time focusing on the event than agents, 
 14 
who controlled the outcome’s occurrence. In this sense, moral agents have insight into the causes 
of moral events in a way that moral patients do not. As moral agents are in control of the extent 
to which amends are made, and have more insight into the causes of these events, I predict that 
they will feel that the events are more psychologically complete than will moral patients.  
Focusing on the negative 
 Though moral events can be both positive and negative, the research presented below 
focuses exclusively on how individuals evaluate and recall negative moral events. This choice 
was made for four reasons: 1) Negatively-valenced events have a greater impact on individuals 
than positively-valenced events of the same type and number, thus, bad things bring about both 
larger and longer-lasting effects on people’s lives (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & 
Vohs, 2001), 2) Positive and negative interactions are weighted differently within interpersonal 
relationships, and would not be perfect counterparts for one another (Gottman, 1998), 3) Bad 
events elicit more processing than good events, even when event expectancy is held constant 
(Abele, 1985), and 4) Bad interactions color opinions more than good ones—though both 
positive and negative interactions with friends influence relationship quality, negative 
interactions seem to have a stronger impact on mental health (Schuster, Kessler, Aseltine, 1990). 
Individuals adapt to emotional events, but this adaptation may not occur at an equal rate—put 
plainly, bad events take more time to mean less (Brickman, Coates, & Janoff-Bulman, 1978). 
Taken together, these findings indicate that experiencing negative events may have a powerful 
and long-lasting influence on both individuals’ interpersonal relationships and the narratives that 
they tell about their lives. 
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Chapter 2 
The construal of moral events 
 On June 22 2012, former Penn State assistant football coach Jerry Sandusky was found 
guilty of 45 counts of sexual abuse. When asked about the allegations, Sandusky claimed that 
what had occurred between himself and underage boys amounted to “horseplay” and that he had 
“maybe tested boundaries.” The boys talked about the events quite differently, referring to what 
happened to them as “emotional agony”, “sick indulgences”, and molestation. There are obvious 
differences between these characterizations of the same event—for Sandusky, the description of 
the event is action-focused, and stripped of valence and moral content. For the victims of his 
abuse, the event is emotionally laden, and full of moral approbation.  
Action identification theory focuses on the relationship between the behaviors that people 
perform and the way in which they think about those behaviors (Vallacher & Wegner, 2012). 
How an action is thought about can change the meaning of the action itself, and can guide 
behavior towards action completion. A great deal of research in social psychology has shown 
that the same action can be construed on multiple levels ranging from high to low (Trope & 
Liberman, 2003; Trope & Liberman, 2010). High-level construals involve conceptualizing the 
action in an abstract way—one that captures the meaning of the event. Low-level construals 
instead involve conceptualizing the action in terms of the concrete details of its actualization 
(Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002).  For example, breaking an item that someone lent you 
could be represented at the high level as “damaging another person’s property” and at a lower 
level as “dropping something on the ground.” 
The goal of the research below is to show that the typical level of construal for immoral 
events tends to be high level, but that this shifts to a lower level when individuals themselves 
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have completed the immoral action. This prediction rests on the idea that abstract or high level 
construals lead to increased affective sensitivity, and imbue the target action with meaning and 
place it within a broader context (Critcher & Ferguson, 2011; Trope & Liberman, 2010). As 
affective processes drive moral evaluations (Haidt, 2001), it seems likely that immoral actions 
will tend to be construed at a higher or more abstract level than non-moral actions.  In study 1, I 
test this hypothesis by using the behavioral identification form (BIF; Vallacher & Wegner, 
1989), which presents participants with a target action (e.g. voting) and provides them with two 
possible identifications for the action: one high level (“letting your voice be heard”) and one low 
level (“pulling a lever”). Participants were asked to select the identification that best describes 
the target action. As immoral behaviors are usually thought of as violations of abstract principles 
(e.g. honesty, trust) and tend to evoke emotional states, I predict that participants will more 
frequently select high level identifications to describe immoral target actions than non-moral 
target actions.  
While immoral actions may tend to be identified at a high level, I hypothesize that this is 
not always the case. Work on moral disengagement suggests that when individuals have acted in 
ways that violate their moral codes, they disengage from their behavior by cognitively 
restructuring the meaning of the event (Bandura, 1999). This restructuring can take many forms, 
including euphemistic labeling (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996), 
displacement of responsibility (Milgram, 1974), diffusion of responsibility (Bandura, 
Underwood, Fromson, 1975), and dehumanization of the victim (Cikara, Farnsworth, Harris, & 
Fiske, 2010). Study 2 builds on this idea, suggesting that when individuals have completed 
immoral actions themselves, they will morally disengage by identifying the action at a low level, 
so that it is both less affectively charged and less morally reprehensible.  
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Study 1: Moral events are identified at higher levels 
Previous research has shown that situations are construed in terms of moral principles 
when they are more distant (Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008) and that moral transgressions made 
in the distant future are judged more harshly than those made in the near future (Agerstrom & 
Bjorklund, 2009). Taken together, this suggests that morality lends itself to abstraction. 
Judgments of morality arguably require the situation of the action within a broader context, 
which necessitates a high level representation. For example, imagine kicking a dog that is unable 
to experience pain. Would this action be a moral violation? Perhaps, but certainly less so than if 
the dog had been physically harmed. This is because actions are not in and of themselves are not 
immoral, morality is added when an action becomes situated within a larger framework of right 
and wrong, which is largely determined by the emotions elicited by the event (Gray, Schein, & 
Ward, 2014). In this study, I examine whether there is a stronger tendency for immoral actions to 
be identified at a high level (meaning more abstract or valenced) than at a low level.  
Method 
Participants  
104 participants (45 males, Mage=31.81, SDage = 11.67) were recruited from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk website and paid 10 cents for their participation.   
Materials and Procedures 
Following consent, participants were given the following instructions from the behavioral 
identification form (BIF; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989): 
“Any behavior can be described in many ways. For example, one person might describe 
a behavior as “writing a paper,” while another person might describe the same behavior 
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as “pushing keys on the keyboard.”  Yet another person might describe it as “expressing 
thoughts.”  This form focuses on your personal preferences for how a number of different 
behaviors should be described.  Below you will find several behaviors listed.  After each 
behavior will be two different ways in which the behavior might be identified. For 
example: 
1.  Attending class 
a.  sitting in a chair  
b.  looking at a teacher 
Your task is to choose the identification, a or b, that best describes the behavior for 
you.  Simply place a checkmark next to the option you prefer.  Be sure to respond to every 
item.  Please mark only one alternative for each pair.  Remember, mark the description 
that you personally believe is more appropriate for each pair.”  
Participants then completed a subset of five non-moral target behaviors from the BIF and five 
questions that involved an immoral target behavior, To determine common immoral target 
behaviors, 45 participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website, and were 
asked to list what they thought were the fifteen most common immoral behaviors that an 
individual would perform in his or her lifetime. These lists were combined, and coded by two 
research assistants in order to determine which immoral actions were perceived to be the most 
common. These actions were then used to create the target immoral actions that participants 
categorized in this study (for a copy of the materials, see Appendix). For example, the target 
behavior “Cheating on a significant other” could be identified at a low level as “hooking up with 
someone else” or at a high level as “being unfaithful”. Following these measures, participants 
completed a brief demographic survey. 
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Results 
 For each target behavior, selection of the low-level identification was coded as 0, and 
selection of the high-level identification was coded as 1. The five target behaviors from the 
original BIF were summed and averaged to create a composite non-moral behavioral 
identification score and the five immoral target behaviors were summed and averaged to create a 
composite immoral behavioral identification score. As predicted, in a paired t-test, immoral 
behaviors were identified at a higher-level significantly more often (M = .67, SD = .24) than non-
moral behaviors (M = .59, SD = .27), t(103) = 2.34, p < .05 (Fig. 1).  
   
Figure 1. Moral items are identified at a significantly higher level than non-moral items on a 
modified Behavioral Identification Task (BIF). 
Discussion 
 Study 1 indicates that immoral events tend to be construed at a higher level than non-
moral events. Across ten target actions (five immoral, five non-moral), participants identified the 
high level as better describing the immoral behaviors than the non-moral behaviors. These 
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findings support the prediction that moral events are thought about at a higher level of 
abstraction than non-moral events.  
Study 2: But what if I’ve done it? 
 
 Some have suggested that as individuals become more familiar with performing an 
action, they tend to identify it more in terms of its high-level implications and meaning rather 
than its low-level details (Vallacher & Wegner, 2012). For example, for a child learning to ride a 
bike, the focus is on moving one pedal in front of the other and maintaining balance—only when 
the behavior has been fully learned does bike riding become an act about getting where you want 
to go.  The goal then, is to attain an optimal level of identification, that is, the level that 
facilitates goal attainment.  
If immoral actions are typically identified at a higher level so as to promote the 
attainment of moral goals, once an immoral action has been completed, it may no longer be 
optimal to identify the behavior at a high level. As individuals (even those that have done 
immoral things) still seek to identify as moral people and hold moral goals, I predict that 
performing an immoral action will make people more likely to identify the action at a lower 
level, thus stripping the action of its valence and its link to more abstract moral principles. 
Method 
Participants 
51 participants (38 males, Mage = 32.75, SDage = 11.10) were recruited from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk website, and were paid 50 cents for their participation.  
Materials and Procedures 
Participants were given the same instructions as in Study 1. Participants then identified 
eleven immoral target behaviors as high level or low level (for a copy of materials, see 
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Appendix). Following action identification, participants were then asked to indicate if they 
themselves had performed any of the immoral target behaviors. Participants were given the 
options of “Yes”, “No”, or “I would prefer not to answer.” Following these measures, 
participants completed a brief demographic survey.  
Results 
For each target behavior, selection of the low-level identification was coded as 0, and 
selection of the high-level identification was coded as 1.  Each target behavior also received a 
second score—if participants had reported performing the behavior themselves, it was scored as 
1, if they reported not having done so, it was scored as 0, and if they reported that they would 
prefer not to respond, the score was omitted for that target behavior (Note: this was only the case 
for two instances of one behavior, cheating on one’s significant other).  
Two identification scores were calculated for each participant, one for the behaviors that 
they had reported performing and one for the behaviors that they had reported not performing. 
These scores were calculated by summing and averaging the scores for target behaviors that 
participants indicated that they had performed and summing and averaging the target scores for 
target behaviors that participants indicated they hadn’t performed. The items showed acceptable 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .68). The item-total correlations for the immoral BIF items 
ranged from .11 to .54. 2   
                                                
2 For an item-by-item analysis, see Appendix.  
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In order to further analyze the data, generalized estimating equations (GEE) were used to model 
the relationship between experience (has/hasn’t done the action) and level categorization3. A 
GEE was used in order to adjust for the interdependence between participants’ judgments across 
the 11 items (Ballinger, 2004). A binary logistic regression model was used, with experience 
(coded as 0 =  Hasn’t done and 1 =  Has Done) as the predictor variable. The dependent variable 
in the GEE analysis was level categorization (coded as 0 =  low level and 1 = high level).  As 
predicted, the analysis shows a significant main effect of experience on level categorization (B = 
-.63, SE = .22, p < .01) (Fig 2.). 
 
Figure 2. Immoral actions that individuals have done are more likely to be identified at a lower 
level than immoral actions that participants have not done.   
 
                                                
3 For further analysis, in a paired t-test, participants identified behaviors that they had performed 
at a significantly lower level (M = .68, SD = .27) than behaviors that they hadn’t done (M = .79, 
SD = .26), t(50) = -2.70, p < .01.  
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Discussion 
In this study, participants indicated whether an immoral target action could best be 
identified using a high level description or a low level description. Critically, participants also 
reported whether they had performed the target action themselves. The results indicate that prior 
experience performing an immoral target action is linked to an increased likelihood of making a 
low level identification. An alternate explanation for these results reverses this causal chain; 
perhaps immoral acts that individuals are more likely to construe at a lower level may be those 
actions that people are more likely to perform. In order to address this question, I ran a second 
GEE, this time taking into account the overall frequency of the action within the sample 
population (as measured by the percentage of individuals who had reported completing the 
action). If individuals were more likely to perform actions that they construe at a lower level, we 
would expect overall frequency of the act to predict level categorization. A binary logistic 
regression model was used, with experience (coded as 0 =  Hasn’t done and 1 =  Has Done) and 
frequency of the action (the percentage of individuals who had performed the action) as  
predictor variables. The dependent variable in the GEE analysis was level categorization (coded 
as 0 =  low level and 1 = high level).  The analysis shows that there is still a significant effect of 
experience on level categorization (B = -.72, SE = .26, p <.01), but there is no effect of 
frequency on level categorization (B = .31, SE =.44, p > .40). This suggests that items that are 
undertaken more frequently are not necessarily those that are categorized at a lower level; rather, 
it is the experience of having performed an action that impacts level categorization.  
This effect may be due in part to cognitive dissonance—as individuals generally hold the 
goal to act morally, once they have performed an immoral behavior they have created a dissonant 
relationship between their goals and their actions (Festinger, 1962). One way to reduce this 
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dissonance may be to resolve the conflict by changing the way one thinks about the immoral 
behavior. For example, if looking off of someone’s paper is thought about as “checking an 
answer” rather than “cheating on a test”, it is easier to bring this action in line with one’s identity 
as a good moral person. Another related explanation may be moral disengagement (Bandura, 
1999). When individuals have performed an immoral action, they may seek to dampen down any 
affective responses to their immoral behavior. One way of doing so may be to identify the action 
at a lower level, or one that has less meaning and moral significance.  
General Discussion 
In Study 1, I showed that immoral actions are construed at a higher level than non-moral 
actions. Study 2 built on this result, and showed that whether an immoral action is identified at a 
high level depends on if the individual has performed the act himself or herself. Taken together, 
these results indicate that while immoral behaviors tend to be identified at a high level, this 
process depends critically on one’s prior experiences.  
The tendency for immoral behaviors to be identified at a higher level may be due to 
myriad factors, among them, that high level identification may facilitate greater self-control. 
Activation of high-level construals leads to greater self-control than activation of low-level 
construals due to an increased focus on the global and superordinate features of the action at a 
higher-level (Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006). Construing the immoral behavior at 
a high level may be in the service of making the action more in conflict with one’s goals—
individuals who identify looking off of someone’s paper as “cheating on a test” may be less 
likely to do so. However, self-control often fails, and once the action has been performed, there 
may be a shift towards low level identification in order to minimize the perceived threat to the 
superordinate goal of being a good person. This may partially explain the lay theory of “slippery 
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slopes” in the moral domain (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). Once an immoral action has been 
completed, it may be stripped of its moral and affective content, thus making it more likely to be 
repeated in the future. One reason that individuals may knowingly commit immoral acts is 
because these acts may serve other, low level goals. If an individual who considers himself to be 
a moral person cheats on a test, he may do so in the service of a lower level goal (getting an A) at 
the expense of a more superordinate, or globally held goal (acting morally). In this sense, for 
individuals who hold the superordinate goal of being moral, immoral behaviors can be thought of 
as self-control failure.  
Another explanation for the results of study 2 may be the amount of psychological 
distance that individuals feel from the immoral action. When individuals have performed an 
immoral action, they may feel psychologically closer to the event, which may be leading to more 
low level categorizations. However, reconciling this explanation with the results of study 1 is 
perhaps not as straightforward. While individuals may not have all cheated on their partner (one 
of the immoral target actions), they also have probably not all measured a room for carpeting 
(one of the non-moral target actions).  
Prior research on construal level has shown that individuals are more likely to use 
abstract communication to describe desirable in-group and undesirable out-group behavior, and 
concrete communication to describe undesirable in-group and desirable out-group behavior 
(Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin, 1989). In these studies, participants were from rival sections of 
the Italian city of Siena and were recruited during horseracing season, when racers from each 
town section (or contrada) compete against one another. Participants were shown cartoons 
depicting either an in-group member from their contrada or an outgroup member from a rival 
contrada, performing desirable (e.g. helping another person) or undesirable (e.g. littering) 
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behavior. The researchers then had participants categorize the action that they were observing via 
a multiple-choice response (study 1) or via free response (study 2). The results showed that 
participants were more likely to categorize or describe in-group undesirable behaviors has being 
relatively more concrete and out-group undesirable behaviors as being relatively more abstract. 
The studies presented above build upon these results, and show that people show the same 
pattern of describing undesirable behaviors at a more concrete level when the actor is perhaps the 
closest in-group member of all (oneself). This is perhaps due to the increased stability of high 
level identifications—individuals are motivated to think that in-group members are more 
characterized by their good behaviors, and thus construe those behaviors in a way that makes 
them more emblematic of positive traits. In the same sense, individuals will be motivated to 
construe their own immoral behaviors at a low level identification that are not representative of 
underlying negative traits. Future work should examine this question, in order to gain a better 
sense of how individuals are arriving at abstract or concrete representations of immoral actions.   
These studies show that actions in the moral domain are perhaps thought about 
differently than non-moral actions, and that prior experiences can have a powerful effect on the 
psychological processes underlying the perception of these events. While Jerry Sandusky and his 
victims are equally close to the events that transpired, the moral and emotional ramifications of 
these experiences are perhaps entirely different based on the experience of agency—or of being 
the perpetrator rather than the victim. Agency thus changes not only the experience of the action, 
but also the level at which it is mentally represented. In the next chapter, I aim to show that this 
factor—personal agency—can also have a lasting impact on how actions are perceived, 
interpreted, and recalled.   
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Chapter 3 
Biases in Moral Memory 
In this chapter, I aim to show that personal agency influences autobiographical memory 
for moral events. As mentioned in the introduction, moral situations can be split into two entities, 
moral agents (or those who enact immoral behaviors) and moral patients (or those who 
experience the outcome of the agent’s actions) (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). With this in 
mind, the moral dyad is an ideal place to start in terms of examining the interplay between 
personal agency and autobiographical memory.  
I hypothesize that autobiographical memories for moral patient events will be 
significantly easier to recall than memories for moral agent events. Furthermore, I predict that 
this is because moral patients recall events as having been significantly more negative than do 
moral agents. One of the primary reasons that this may be the case is due to the negative 
emotionality that accompanies victim experiences (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990). A 
potential difference in perceived negativity of the event could be impactful from a memory 
standpoint. Dreben, Fiske, and Hastie (1979) showed that individuals have greater recall for 
negative behavioral information over neutral or desirable behavior information, regardless of the 
order in which the information is presented. In addition, even individuals who report having 
experienced happy childhoods are able to generate a majority of negative memories (Kreitler & 
Kreitler, 1968).  
Increased negativity and emotionality may lead to an increase in ease of recall and 
memory vividness for moral patient events as compared to moral agent events. Individuals have 
lay theories about highly emotional memories—specifically that these memories have a 
“flashbulb effect”, and are remembered as clearly as a photographic image of the memory would 
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be (Brown & Kulik, 1977). One way in which emotion impacts the retrieval process is by 
boosting the recollective experience—the event feels like it is being relived, and this intensity 
increases confidence in the recalled memory (Phelps & Sharot, 2008; Talarico & Rubin, 2003). 
Emotion does seem to boost memory for the event a bit, but it provides an even larger boost to 
one’s subjective sense of recollection (Sharot & Yonelinas, 2008).  
Two important factors that influence the vividness of memory recall are emotional 
arousal and personal involvement (Holland & Kensinger, 2011). When information feels more 
related to you, it is more thoroughly encoded and less likely to be forgotten (Mitchell, Macrae, & 
Banaji, 2004). As seen in Chapter 2, once an individual has performed an immoral behavior, they 
are more likely to identify it at a lower, less affective, level. This level shift may allow moral 
agents to dampen their affective experience and feelings of personal involvement for the actions 
that they have performed, thus leading to less vivid memories for the event.  
Intentionality and moral memory 
One contributor to event negativity may be the extent to which the moral agent acted 
intentionally. Prior research supports this hypothesis—intentional harms are judged as worse 
than unintentional harms, even when their outcomes are the same (Ames & Fiske, 2013) and 
intentional harms physically “hurt” more than unintentional harms (Gray & Wegner, 2008). 
Intentionality may hurt more because it’s viewed as a strong indicator that someone is actually 
trying to cause you pain—adding insult to moral injury. 
Previous research has demonstrated that some behaviors might be better recollected 
because they are more diagnostic than others (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987).  For example, 
frequent lying says more about a person’s character than frequent pie eating does, and when 
individuals make choices about whom to interact with, it is perhaps better to remember who 
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tends to lie more than who tends to eat pie. As intentionally causing another person harm could 
be viewed as diagnostic of one’s moral character, intentional harms may be better recalled than 
unintentional harms. However, I do not think that this will be the case across both members of 
the moral dyad. I predict that intentional harms are likely to be viewed as more negative, and 
thus better recalled for moral patients, but that the opposite will be true for moral agents. After 
all, agents have reasons for their intentional actions, and likely acted in service of a desired goal.  
In the research presented below, I show that individuals are better able to recall events in 
which they were moral patients than those in which they were moral agents, and that this 
memory asymmetry is due to differences in perceived negativity of the event. I further test and 
show that this effect is moderated by the extent to which agents were perceived to have acted 
intentionally, and that increases in perceived agent intentionality are associated with increases in 
memory accuracy.    
Study 3: More Patients than Agents 
Negative moral events tend to involve harm (Ward, Olsen, & Wegner, 2013). As both 
being harmed and harming others evoke negative emotions, we would expect moral events to be 
reasonably emotional. However, this prediction is complicated by the fact that some individuals 
caused the harm (agents), and others received it (patients). As discussed above, individuals tend 
to have better recall for emotional events. While harm in and of itself may make the event 
emotionally impactful, I suggest that it does not do so equally for both members of the moral 
dyad. Instead, I hypothesize that, as moral patient events are a more aversive and potentially 
more arousing experience, individuals will recall more moral patient events in their lives than 
moral agent events.  
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Method 
Participants 
One hundred participants (66 males, Mage=30.73, SDage=10.4) were recruited from 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website and paid 25 cents for their participation.  
Materials and Procedures 
Following consent, participants were presented with a brief explanation of the moral 
dyad. Moral agents were defined as “individuals whose intentions and actions bring about 
harmful events” and that moral patients were defined as “individuals who experience feelings 
and emotions brought about by the moral agent’s actions.” Following these definitions 
participants were given an example of moral agency and patiency: 
“Jenny and Elizabeth are waiting in line at a concert. When the doors to the concert hall 
open, Jenny sees that Elizabeth is in front of her, and pushes past Elizabeth to get inside 
first. Elizabeth falls down and cuts her knee.” 
Participants were then told that the same individual can be a moral agent or a moral patient 
depending on the situation in which he or she finds himself or herself. They were then presented 
with another scenario showing an agency/patiency “flip” from the first example: 
“Jenny and Elizabeth are close friends. Jenny tells Elizabeth that she and her boyfriend, 
Mark, have been fighting recently. Elizabeth tells her not to worry, and that everything 
will be fine. Later that day, Jenny sees Elizabeth and Mark passionately kissing. Jenny 
turns away and begins crying.” 
Following these examples, participants were asked to think about the previous six months, and to 
recall the number of times that they had been a moral patient and a moral agent during that time 
period on a sliding scale from 0 to 10+. Which role they were asked to recall first (agent or 
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patient) was counterbalanced across participants. They were also asked to write down a word 
that they associated with each recalled memory (in order to ensure that they were recalling 
concrete events rather than merely estimating the number of times that they had been a patient or 
an agent). Following both recall tasks (agent and patient), participants completed a brief 
demographic survey.  
Results 
 The effect of agent-patient status on the number of recalled memories was examined with 
a repeated-measures ANOVA with moral status as the within-subjects factor and condition order 
as a between-subjects factor. The number of memories recalled was the dependent measure. As 
predicted, there was a main effect of moral status on number of recalled memories, such that 
participants recalled that they had been a moral patient (M = 2.73, SD = 2.91) significantly more 
times than they recalled being a moral agent (M = 1.72, SD = 2.12) over the six-month period, 
F(1,98) = 11.46, p < .005.   
Intriguingly, there was also a significant interaction between condition order and number 
of memories recalled in each moral status condition F(1,98) = 15.38, p < .0005. Post hoc 
analyses revealed that participants who had recalled being a moral patient first recalled 
significantly more instances of moral patiency (M = 3.50, SD = 3.30) than participants who 
recalled being a moral patient second (M = 1.96, SD = 2.24), F(1,98) = 7.445, p < .01. 
Participants who had recalled being a moral agent first recalled marginally more instances of 
moral agency (M = 2.12, SD = 2.07) than participants who recalled being a moral agent second 
(M = 1.32, SD = 2.12), F(1,98) = 3.645, p = .06. Furthermore, when individuals recalled patient 
events first, they recalled significantly more patient events (M = 3.50, SD = 3.20) than agent 
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events (M = 1.32, SD = 2.12), F(1,98) = 26.70, p < .0005. When individuals recalled agent 
events first, there was not a significant difference between the number of recalled patient events  
(M = 1.96, SD = 2.24) and agent events (M = 2.12, SD = 2.07), F(1,98) = .14, p > .70 (see 
Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. The order in which participants recall moral agent and patient events influences the 
total number of moral patient events recalled. 
Discussion 
In the study above, I show that individuals unequally report moral agent and patient 
events, such that individuals report that they were moral patients significantly more frequently 
than they were moral agents. However, this effect is influenced by which role is recalled first. 
Previous research has shown that when an individual is perceived as a moral agent or patient, 
this characterization “sticks”, such that the person is perceived as being more of an agent or a 
patient in later scenarios (Gray & Wegner, 2009). Intriguingly, the interaction observed in this 
study may be indicative of this type of moral typecasting within the self. Once individuals have 
recalled agent experiences they are less able to recall patient experiences (as compared to those 
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who recalled patient events first), and once individuals have recalled patient experiences they are 
less able to recall agent experiences (as compared to those who recalled agent events first). Much 
as agency or patiency sticks to our perceptions of others, it is possible that these characterizations 
may similarly impact our perception of ourselves.      
 While this is an interesting question for future research, in order to understand the 
emotional framework of moral events from the agent or patient perspective, it is necessary to 
first examine differences in the affective qualities that underlie these two roles at the inter-
individual level. The interaction observed in this study suggests that recalling an event from one 
perspective may preclude one’s recalling event from the other. For this reason, the rest of the 
studies were run between-subjects, in order to get a better sense of the properties of moral agent 
and patient memories as they function dyadically between two people rather than within the 
same person. The next study focuses on one potential divergence in the recall of moral agent and 
moral patient events: perceived event negativity. Specifically, I predict that moral patiency is a 
more negative experience than moral agency, and thus that moral patient events will be both 
more detailed and easier to recall.   
Study 4: Negativity and Moral Memory 
As the research presented thus far shows, one’s role in a moral event has a profound 
impact on how it is perceived and how it is recalled. Or, perhaps a country song put it best—
sometimes you’re the windshield, and sometimes you’re the bug (Chapin-Carpenter, 1992). For 
the bug, hitting the windshield is a life-changing (indeed, life-ending) experience. For the 
windshield, or the person driving the car, it’s a minor incident that is often not worthy of notice. 
While moral agents probably feel a bit more than the driver of the bug-killing car when they 
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morally transgress, it seems likely that moral patients will frequently have a more negative 
experience than will moral agents.  
Study 3 showed that individuals were able to recall more moral patient events than moral 
agent events. In Study 4, I focus on a potential mechanism for this result, specifically examining 
the role that event negativity plays in the recollection of moral events. I hypothesize that 
individuals will report that moral patient events are more negative than moral agent events, and 
that this heightened negativity will lead to an increase in both reported ease of recall and in the 
number of details that individuals are able to remember about the event.  
Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and fifty (160 males, Mage=28.75, SDage=8.78) participants were recruited 
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website and paid 25 cents for their participation.  
Materials and Procedures 
As in study 3, participants were again given a brief explanation of the moral dyad and the 
same examples. Following these examples, participants were randomly assigned to either the 
moral agent condition or the moral patient condition. In the moral agent condition, participants 
were presented with the following prompt:  
“Take a moment and think about a time when you were a MORAL AGENT, a time when 
your actions or intentions led to another person being harmed (physically, emotionally, 
or mentally).” 
Participants in the moral patient condition were presented with the following prompt: 
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“Take a moment and think about a time when you were a MORAL PATIENT, a time 
when the actions of another individual led to you being harmed (physically, emotionally, 
or mentally).” 
Following memory recollection, participants in both conditions were asked how easy it was to 
recall being a moral agent/patient on a scale from 1 (“Very difficult”) to 7 (“Very easy”), how 
many sensory details they were able to recall from the event (0, 1-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7+), and how 
negative the event was on a scale from 1 (“Not at all negative”) to 7 (“Extremely negative”). 
Following these measures, participants completed a brief demographic survey. 
Results and Discussion 
 As predicted, there was a main effect of condition on ease of recall, such that participants 
in the moral patient condition found it significantly easier to recall an event (M = 5.03,  
SD = 1.61) than participants in the moral agent condition (M = 4.30, SD = 1.90), t(248) = 3.28,  
p <  .005. In addition, participants who recalled being a moral patient reported recalling more 
sensory details (M = 2.72, SD = .981) than participants who recalled being a moral agent  
(M = 2.46, SD = .96), t(248) = 2.19, p < .05. Participants in the moral patient condition also 
indicated that the event was significantly more negative (M = 4.88, SD = 1.51) than participants 
in the moral agent condition (M = 4.15, SD = 1.60), t(248) = 3.74, p < .0005.  
Negativity and sensory details. In order to test our prediction that negativity mediates the 
relationship between moral status (moral agency and patiency) and the number of sensory details 
recalled, I conducted a mediational analysis (Hayes, 2013).  Moral status predicted both the 
number of sensory details recalled (b = -.27, SE = .12, p < .05) and the negativity of the event  
(b = -.74, SE = .20, p < .0005). The relationship between moral status and the number of sensory 
details recalled dropped to non-significance (b = -.08, SE = .12, p > .40) when adjusting for 
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differences in negativity of the recalled event. A bias-corrected bootstrap 95% CI indicated that 
the indirect effect through negativity was significant, a ×b = -.184, 95% CI: [-.32, -.09] (Fig 4).4 
 
Figure 4. Event negativity mediates the relationship between moral status and the number of 
sensory details recalled about the event.  
Negativity and ease of recall. Negativity also mediates the relationship between moral status 
(moral agency and patiency) and the number of ease of recall. Moral status predicted both ease 
of recall (b = -.73, SE = .22, p < .05) and the negativity of the event (b = -.74, SE = .20,  
p < .0005). The relationship between moral status and the ease of recall dropped to non-
significance (b = -.38, SE = .21, p > .05) when adjusting for differences in negativity of the 
recalled event. A bias-corrected bootstrap 95% CI indicated that the indirect effect through 
negativity was significant, a ×b = -.35, 95% CI: [-.60, -.15].5 
These results indicate that not only is being a moral patient a significantly more negative 
experience than being a moral agent, but that this negativity leads to both enhanced recall for 
sensory details about the event and to increased subjective ease of recall. This heightened 
                                                
4 For reverse mediation model, see Figure 14 in the Appendix.  
5 For reverse mediation model, see Figure 15 in the Appendix. 
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negativity based on moral status (patient/agent) may partially underlie the effect observed in 
study 3. That participants can recall more details surrounding moral patient events suggests that 
these events may be more vivid in their memory. Furthermore, individuals report that patient 
events are easier to recall, suggesting that these memories may be more accessible than agent 
events.   
Study 5: Intentionality, Negativity, and Memory Intensity 
As study 4 showed, moral patient events are considered to be significantly more negative 
than moral agent events, and this negativity mediates the relationship between moral status and 
the extent to which the event is recalled. However, what underlies this increased negativity? 
Certainly experiencing harm is an unpleasant and aversive experience, but harming others is by 
no means pleasant (Milgram, 1974; Nichols, 2002). In this study, I show that one important 
contributor to event negativity is the extent to which the moral agent was perceived to have acted 
intentionally.  
Prior research has shown that intentional harms both hurt more and are viewed as more 
blameworthy than unintentional harms, even when the outcomes are the same (Gray & Wegner, 
2008; Ames & Fiske, 2013). Thus, I propose a model wherein agent intentionality moderates the 
relationship between moral status and memory intensity, and that this interactive effect is 
mediated through event negativity (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. Proposed model of the relationship between moral status and memory intensity, with 
negativity as a mediator variable, and agent intentionality as a moderating variable between 
moral status and memory intensity. 
By memory intensity, I mean the extent to which a memory feels vivid, is easy to recall, 
and the extent to which individuals feel confident in the accuracy of their memory. The choice of 
focusing on memory intensity in this study, rather than recalled details associated with the 
memory itself is a deliberate one. When we think of memory retrieval, a distinction can be made 
between the process through which the memory is recollected and the details of the memory 
itself. While both are common measures of memory, emotions have been shown to enhance the 
subjective sense of recollection, while its influence on memory accuracy is mixed (see: Phelps & 
Sharot, 2008; Sharot, Delgado, & Phelps, 2004). The previous study focused on the latter, and 
found that negativity mediated the relationship between moral status and the number of details 
that individuals could recall about the event. This study focuses on whether moral status, 
negativity, and intentionality also influence the former, or the process by which the memory is 
recalled.  
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Method 
Participants 
Two hundred participants (143 males, Mage=28.38, SDage=8.22) were recruited from 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website and paid 15 cents for their participation.  
Materials and Procedures 
As in studies 3 and 4, participants were given an explanation of the moral dyad and the same 
examples. Participants were then randomly assigned to one condition of a 2 (moral status: agent 
or patient) x 2 (agent intent: intentional or accidental) full-factorial design. Moral status was 
manipulated as in Study 4. Agent intent was manipulated by having participants recall a time 
when the harm caused by the event was either accidental or intentional. Following memory 
recollection, participants in all four conditions were asked how easy the memory had been to 
recall, how vivid their memory was for the event, how confident they were in their memory for 
the event, and how negative the event was. All questions were evaluated on a seven-point scale 
from 1 (“Not at all”) to 7 (“Extremely”). Following these measures, participants completed a 
brief demographic survey. 
Results 
One participant failed to complete the experiment, leaving us with 199 participants. The 
measures of confidence, ease, and vividness were summed and averaged (Cronbach’s alpha = 
.86) to create a measure of memory intensity. 
Intentionality and Negativity. Replicating our prior results, participants in the moral patient 
condition reported that the event was significantly more negative (M = 4.81, SD = 1.49) than 
participants in the moral agent condition (M = 4.35, SD = 1.36), F (1,195) = 5.34, p < .05. There 
was no main effect of intentionality, such that intentional actions (M = 4.74, SD = 1.44) were not 
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more negative than accidental actions (M = 4.42, SD = 1.43), F(1,195) = 2.48, p > .10. The 
interaction between moral status and intentionality was significant, F(1,195) = 15.10, p < .0005 
(Figure 6). Post hoc analyses revealed that for intentional harms, patients experienced more 
negativity (M = 5.32, SD = 1.34) than did agents (M = 4.12, SD = 1.29), F(1,195) = 19.49,  
p < .0005. For accidental harms, there were no significant differences between patients  
(M = 4.27, SD = 1.45) and agents (M = 4.57, SD = 1.40) on reported negativity,  
F(1,195) = 1.22, p > .20. 
 
 
Figure 6. Agent intent moderates the relationship between moral status and negativity.  
Intentionality and Memory Intensity. There was not a significant main effect of moral status, 
F(1,195) = 2.33, p = .13, on memory intensity and there was a marginal main effect of 
intentionality, F(1,195) = 2.89, p = .09, on memory intensity. Importantly, there was a significant 
interaction between moral status and agent intent, F(1,195) = 5.33, p < .05 (Fig. 7).  Post hoc 
analyses revealed for intentional harms, patients experienced greater memory intensity  
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(M = 4.84, SD = 1.58) than did agents (M = 4.01, SD = 1.61), F(1,195) = 7.45, p < .01. For 
accidental harms, there were no significant differences between patients (M = 4.71, SD = 1.41) 
and agents (M = 4.88, SD = 1.52) on memory intensity, F(1,195) = .30, p>.50. 
 
Figure 7. Agent intent moderates the relationship between moral status and memory intensity. 
Testing the proposed model. As shown above, intentionality moderates both the relationship 
between moral status and negativity, and also the relationship between moral status and memory 
intensity. As study 4 showed that negativity mediates the relationship between moral status and 
memory recall, and these results show that negativity is moderated by agent intent, I predict that 
there will be a conditional indirect effect of moral status on memory intensity through negativity. 
PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) was used to estimate the model coefficients and conditional direct and 
indirect effects. As shown in Figure 8, the effect of moral status on negativity is contingent upon 
agent intent, as seen by the significant interaction between moral status and intent in the model 
of negativity (b = -1.51, SE = .39, p  < .0005). There is a significant indirect effect of status on 
memory intensity when the agent acted intentionally (b= -.498, 95% CI: -.820, -.262) but not 
when the agent acted accidentally (b = .126, 95% CI: -.107, .389). Negativity thus mediates the 
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effect of moral status on memory intensity when the harm was intentional, but not when the 
harm was accidental.  
 
 
Figure 8. Agent intent moderates the indirect effect of moral status on memory intensity through 
negativity, and moderates the direct effect of moral status on memory intensity.  
Discussion 
 Study 5 showed that the relationship between moral status, negativity, and memory 
intensity is moderated by whether or not the agent’s action was intentional. As predicted, while 
patients still said the event was more negative than agents, this effect was moderated by whether 
or not the agent had acted intentionally. Intentionality also moderated the relationship between 
moral status and memory intensity. This suggests that intent is not only taken into account when 
thinking about how negative the event was, but also that this perceived intentionality further 
influences the feeling of subjective recall for the event through its effect on negativity.  
Pizarro and colleagues (2006) showed that if a moral agent’s bad behavior was viewed as 
more intentional, this led to both more moral blame and more memory distortions. In this study, 
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participants read a vignette about a man named Frank who had walked out on a restaurant bill. 
Participants either read a version in which Frank’s behavior had been unintentional (his daughter 
had been involved in a serious accident), or intentional (he had deliberately—and with great 
enjoyment—left the bill unpaid). When recalling the events at a later date, participants in the 
intentional condition not only said that Frank had walked out on a larger bill than he did, but that 
the degree of memory distortion (differences between the recalled and the actual amount that 
Frank walked out on) was associated with how much moral blame participants thought that 
Frank deserved. In the study below, I look at how moral blame and ascriptions of agent 
intentionality may impact memory recollection for real-world moral events.    
Study 6: Play ball 
On April 23rd 2014, Yankees pitcher Michael Pineda was discovered using pine tar—a 
substance that allows for greater ball control and is against the rules of Major League Baseball—
during a game with the Boston Red Sox. Pineda was ejected from the game in the second inning. 
While the Red Sox came back to win the game, fans on both teams were outraged. This game 
thus presented an opportunity to examine how factors like perceived agent intentionality impact 
memory recall for real world moral events.  
For this study, one could make two potentially competing predictions. As a Yankees 
pitcher had broken the rule, one might expect Red Sox fans to feel more morally victimized, and 
thus have greater memory for details surrounding the game. However, because the Red Sox went 
on to win the game, Red Sox fans may feel more positively about the game than Yankees fans 
(who, if their pitcher had not been ejected, may have won the game). As fans of both teams 
would thus have compelling cases for feeling morally wronged by the pitcher’s rule-breaking, we 
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predicted that the extent to which the pitcher was imbued with agency for his immoral actions 
would drive memory accuracy, regardless of team affiliation. 
Method 
Participants 
40 participants (29 males, Mage=31.6, SDage=8.83) were recruited within 36 hours of the 
baseball game from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website and paid 25 cents for their participation. 
Nineteen (19) Yankees fans and 21 Red Sox fans participated in this study.  
Materials and Procedures 
All participants reported that they had watched the game on April 23rd, 2014. In order to 
assess the strength of their fan identification, participants were asked how long they had been a 
fan of their team  (“less than one year”, “less than five years”, “more than five years”, “more 
than ten years”), how many games they typically watched in a season (“1-5”, “6-10”, “more 
than 10”), if they had ever been to their team’s home stadium (“Yes” or “No”), how important 
being a fan of their team was to them (on a scale from 1 = “unimportant” to 7 = “extremely 
important”), and how much they disliked the rival team (on a scale from 1 = “I don’t dislike the 
Yankees/Red Sox” to 7 = “I extremely dislike the Yankees/Red Sox”). In order to increase 
identification with their team prior to the memory task, participants were also asked recall their 
favorite memory related to being a fan of their team.  
Following the fan identification task, participants were then asked a series of questions 
about the game on April 23rd, in which the Yankees pitcher used pine tar and broke the major 
league baseball rule. Questions included general inquiries about the game (e.g. where it was 
being played, who scored specific runs, what the score was during a specific inning, who the 
opening and closing pitchers were) and questions specifically related to the pine tar incident (i.e. 
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in what inning it occurred, where the pine tar was discovered), for 13 memory questions in total 
(see Appendix for study materials).  
Following the memory questions, participants were asked a series of questions related to 
how they felt about the incident, including: 1) How negatively they felt about the event, 2) How 
upset and angry they were about the game, 3) How intentional the pitcher’s behavior was, 4) 
How responsible they felt the pitcher was for his behavior, 5) How morally wrong they felt the 
behavior was, 6) How upset they were about the game, 7) How negatively they felt about the 
game, 8) How much blame they felt the pitcher deserved, and 9) Whether they felt that the rule 
banning pine tar should be changed. In order to see if feelings about the individual pitcher were 
different from feelings about the team, participants also completed the intentionality, 
responsibility, control, moral wrongness, and blame questions at the team level.  All questions 
were evaluated on a seven-point scale from 1 (“Not at all”) to 7 (“Extremely”).  
Results 
Negativity and team affiliation. One participant reported using the Internet to look up the 
answers on the memory task, and was excluded from analysis. There were no differences on any 
measure of strength of fan identification across both teams. The measures of negativity, being 
upset, and anger about the event showed good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .86), and 
were summed and averaged to create a measure of negative reactivity. Unsurprisingly based on 
the outcome of the game, Yankees fans were significantly more negatively reactive (M = 3.77, 
SD = 1.45) than Red Sox fans (M = 2.67, SD = 1.34), t(37) = 2.47, p < .05.  
Moral blame and memory accuracy. While the Yankees fans may have felt more negatively 
about the game, there were no differences in the pitcher’s perceived moral wrongness between 
Yankees fans (M = 4.58, SD = 1.71) and Red Sox fans (M = 4.15, SD = 1.95), t(37) = .73,  
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p > .40, with both means above the midpoint, suggesting that fans of both teams felt that the 
action was morally wrong. In addition, there were no differences between Yankees fans (M = 
5.68, SD = 1.34) and Red Sox fans (M = 5.75, SD = 1.59) on assessments of blameworthiness,  
t(37) = .83, p > .80, with both means above the midpoint. I performed two one-sample t-tests 
against the midpoint for both moral wrongness (M = 4.36, SD = 1.83), t(38) = 1.22, p > .20 and 
blameworthiness (M = 5.72, SD = 1.45), t(38) = 7.40, p < .0005. Taken together, this suggests 
that fans of both teams felt that the action was blameworthy and morally unacceptable. 
 In order to calculate memory accuracy, participants were given a score of “1” for every 
memory question that they answered correctly, and a score of “0” for every question answered 
incorrectly. These scores were summed and averaged, resulting in a percentage score for 
memory accuracy. For example, if a participant had gotten 8 out of the 13 memory questions 
correctly, he would have an overall memory accuracy score of 61%. There was a marginal 
relationship between blameworthiness and memory accuracy, r(39) = .295, p =.07 (for all 
correlations, see Table 1).   
Intentionality and Memory Accuracy. As the results of study 5 indicate that perceived 
intentionality moderates the relationship between moral status and memory intensity, I predicted 
that as all participants felt that the behavior was morally blameworthy, they could be construed 
as moral patients, and thus that perceived intentionality would be predictive of memory accuracy 
independently of team affiliation. The measures of intentionality, responsibility, and control for 
both pitcher Michael Pineda and the New York Yankees showed good internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alphas =  .77 and .79) and were summed and averaged to create measures of Agent 
Intent and Team Intent, respectively. Regression analysis was used to test if perceived agent 
intentionality (Agent Intent) significantly predicted memory accuracy independently of team 
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affiliation. The results indicated that, when adjusting for team affiliation and time elapsed since 
the game, perceived agent intentionality significantly predicted overall memory accuracy  
(b = .44, SE=.05 p < .01). These results indicate that perceived agent intentionality for morally 
blameworthy behavior is linked to enhanced memory for moral events (for all correlations, see 
Table 1).  
Discussion 
 In this study, participants who had observed a real-world moral transgression were asked 
to recall specific details about the event. The results indicate that perceived intentionality and 
moral blameworthiness play a role in memory accuracy, such that individuals who perceived 
Pineda’s actions to be more intentional and more morally blameworthy had better memory for 
the event. Thus, the extent to which individuals imbued Pineda with agentic qualities impacted 
the extent to which the event was remembered accurately, suggesting that perceptions of moral 
agency may lead to increases in memory for moral events.  
However, an alternative explanation of the results could be that individuals who were 
paying more attention to the game in the first place may also be those who were more likely to 
perceive Pineda’s behavior as having been intentional. In order to be caught using pine tar, a 
pitcher needs to first put pine tar on his hands, an action that is perhaps less ambiguous with 
regard to intentionality and responsibility than other immoral actions that pitcher could perform 
(e.g. hitting a batter). Individuals who were more carefully watching the game could also have 
been those who would be more likely to identify the action as intentional. One way of exploring 
this explanation could be using a more malleable memory measure (e.g. recalled strikeouts or 
hits) and seeing if perceived intentionality leads to increased memory deviations. As mentioned 
earlier, Pizarro and colleagues (2006) found that perceived intentionality led to memory 
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distortions that made the agent’s behavior more morally blameworthy. If intentionality is 
similarly impacting memory for the ballgame, we might expect that participants who viewed the 
behavior as more intentional might be more likely to think that Pineda benefitted more from his 
pine tar usage (by pitching more strikes or striking out more batters) than was actually the case. 
This type of memory measure would weaken the alternative explanation that increased attention 
leads to increased perceptions of intentionality. Future work should combine both objective and 
malleable measures of attention to more fully address this point.  
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Table 1. Intentionality and Memory (Study 6) 
                                                
6 Team affiliation was coded as Yankees = 1 and Red Sox = 2. 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Team affiliation6 -          
2. Rival dislike .124 -         
3. Negative reactivity -.376* -.012 -        
4. Agent Intent .213 .048 -.117 -       
5. Agent Blame .023 .299 .158 .542** -      
6. Agent Wrong -.119 .207 .466* .071 .416** -     
7. Team Intent .138 .164 .162 .199 .342* .480** -    
8. Team Blame .171 .261 .037 .112 .278 .312 .692** -   
9. Team Wrong -.001 .122 .301 -.084 .199 .601** .639** .448** -  
10. Memory Accuracy .359* -.017 .099 .500** .295t -.063 -.081 -.242 -.173 - 
 50 
General Discussion 
As these four studies potentially demonstrate, the relationship between negativity, 
intentionality, and memory is a complicated one. These results complement prior research 
showing that autobiographical recall is a motivated process. In one study, Bo Sanitioso & 
Niedenthal (2006) told half of participants that introversion was linked to academic success, and 
the other half was led to believe that introversion was linked to academic failure.  All 
participants were then asked to recall five instances in which they had exhibited introverted 
tendencies. The researchers found that the recall task was significantly easier for participants that 
had been led to believe that introversion leads to success than individuals who had been told the 
opposite. Further, they found that this ease of recall mediated the relationship between condition 
(introvert-success, introvert-failure) and self-perception, as measured by the extent to which 
individuals reported that they were indeed introverted. Specifically, individuals who had been 
told that introversion was linked to failure recalled fewer introversion incidents and reported 
lower self-identification as an introvert.   
A similar process may be partially underlying the results of study 3, in which participants 
reported that they were able to recall more events in which they had been a moral patient than 
events in which they had been a moral agent. Previous research has shown that individuals over-
report desirable behaviors, and under-report undesirable ones (Ganster, Hennessy, & Luthans, 
1983). In this case, moral agency may be viewed as a particularly undesirable behavior. While 
the motivation explanation may partially underlie the recall differences in this chapter, there is 
good reason to believe that it is not the full story. As you may recall in study 3, participants 
showed an order effect (see Figure 3) such that individuals who recalled being moral agents first 
recalled significantly fewer patient events than individuals who recalled being patients first. If 
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this effect were being driven by a motivation to maintain a positive self-image, we might expect 
the opposite result. A natural defensive mechanism to self-threatening information (i.e. “I am a 
person who has harmed people”) might be to think of even more times when one has been 
harmed. The data does not reflect this pattern, and suggests that self-enhancement might not be 
the only process at work here. 
Studies 4 through 6 show that negativity and intentionality both make meaningful 
contributions to memory recall for moral events. In study 4, negativity was shown to mediate the 
relationship between moral status and the number of details recalled about the moral event. In 
study 5, the relationship between moral status and negativity was moderated by the extent to 
which the agent had acted intentionally, specifically, patients felt that intentional harms were 
significantly more negative than agents. Agent intentionality also moderated the relationship 
between moral status and memory recall, such that intentional behaviors led to greater memory 
intensity than accidental behaviors, In study 6, perceived intentionality was shown to impact 
memory accuracy for a real-world moral transgression. In this study, the extent to which a 
cheating baseball player’s behavior was viewed as intentional was linked to how well the details 
of the event were remembered.  
Previous research has shown that social inferences function within a hierarchy (Malle & 
Holbrook, 2012). The researchers demonstrated that of 4 major inferences made when 
interpreting behavior (intentionality, desire, belief, and personality), intentionality and desire 
inferences occur first, followed by beliefs, and lastly personality. That intentionality inferences 
are made quickly is important, because when patients view agents doing bad things to them, they 
may be more likely to infer that this behavior is intentional (as doing bad things is typically 
diagnostic of being a bad person). Unless they have the motivational or cognitive resources to 
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engage in more processing, actions that were not particularly intentional may be categorized as 
more so. After all, agents don’t always do bad things knowingly. For example, a grad student 
reading an article for her dissertation may be so engrossed that she might not even notice the 
very pregnant woman standing in front of her on the crowded subway train. To everyone around 
her, this act may look more intentional than the behavior actually was.  
The studies in Chapter 4 show that memories for moral events in one’s life are 
systematically and predictably biased. Individuals are better able to recall times that they were 
moral patients than when they were moral agents, this ease of recall is due to the increased 
negativity that goes along with being a moral patient, but that critically, this negativity is 
contingent upon whether the moral agent is perceived to have acted intentionally.  
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Chapter 4 
Moral Memory and Psychological Completeness 
 In 1907, a child’s bike was stolen from in front of a public library in Wilkes-Barre, 
Pennsylvania. This was by no means the first bike that has ever been stolen, and it won’t be the 
last. However, this particular bike belonged to a little boy named Herman Mankiewicz, who 
never forgot about the theft, and would go on to use his stolen bicycle as the inspiration for a 
very famous sled called “Rosebud” (Meryman, 1978). Mankiewicz wrote the classic 1942 film 
“Citizen Kane”, in which a journalist seeks to uncover the meaning behind “Rosebud”, the 
famous last word of an enigmatic millionaire, Charles Foster Kane, on his deathbed. By the end 
of the film, viewers learn that Rosebud refers to a sled, and was meant to be a symbol for the 
only happy period in Kane’s life, his childhood. What this anecdote illustrates is that moral 
patient events stick with us—whether it’s stolen bikes, broken hearts, or bruised egos.  
 In the previous chapter, I showed that moral patient events are more negative than moral 
agent events, and that while this negativity leads to increased memory recall and intensity, it is 
moderated by the extent to which the moral agent acted intentionally. In this chapter, I examine 
another possible mechanism for these results: the Zeigarnik effect (Zeigarnik, 1935). This effect 
describes the tendency for uncompleted tasks to be better recalled than those that have been 
completed, due to a feeling of unresolved tension that is resolved once the task has been finished.  
In the studies below, I propose that negative moral events feel similarly incomplete, particularly 
for moral patients.  
When events are negative, individuals spend more time thinking about the reasons for 
their occurrence. For example, research looking at memory for life events has shown that 
individuals remember more information when they lose as compared to when they win 
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(Gilovich, 1983). In one study, participants made a series of bets about NFL football games for 
the following week. A few days later (when the games had been completed) the participants 
returned to the lab to settle their bets and to record their thoughts on the games. A third session 
was completed a few weeks later, in which participants were called and asked to report what they 
recalled of the games that they had bet on. The results showed that participants recalled more 
details about games on which they had lost (by betting on the wrong team) than games in which 
they had won. In addition, individuals recalled their losses before they mentioned their wins, 
suggesting that losses may be easier to retrieve.  This ease of recall was due, in part, to 
individuals spending an increased amount of time dwelling on the reasons for their losses as 
compared to the reasons for their wins. While most moral patient events are certainly worse than 
losing football bets, I propose that similar psychological processes underlie both experiences.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, individuals think about regrets of inaction more frequently 
than they think about regrets of action (Savitsky, Medvec, & Gilovich, 1997). Betting, regrets of 
inaction, and moral patiency have a surprising element in common: a perceived lack of control 
over an outcome.  As agents both cause moral events to occur, and are responsible for making 
amends, they arguably have more situational control than do patients. In this chapter, I aim to 
show that one reason that moral patient events may be better recalled than moral agent events is 
due to the former’s tendency to feel less psychologically complete than the latter, and that this 
psychological incompleteness is due to a lack of situational control.  
This is not to say that moral patients are completely helpless—after all, individuals often 
seek and achieve a sense of closure after traumatic or negative events have occurred (Taylor, 
1991; Gilbert, 2006). One way in which individuals may gain closure is by seeking amends or 
granting forgiveness. In study 7, I explore this possibility, and hypothesize that the extent to 
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which amends were made by the moral agent will impact feelings of psychological 
completeness. However, moral actions—particularly intentional ones—are the result of 
underlying causes. In study 8, I hypothesize that knowledge of the cause of moral events is one-
sided with regard to the moral dyad, such that agents have more knowledge of the causes of the 
event, and this understanding of why the event occurred may lead to increased feelings of 
psychological completeness.  
Study 7: Psychological Completeness and Amends 
 In the teen horror film “I Know What You Did Last Summer”, a group of college 
students are terrorized by a man whom they had run over with a car the preceding summer and 
had left for dead. This man proceeds to impale one of the teens with a fish hook and dispose of 
two of their bodies in a storage freezer. Grudges, as it turns out, can be a bit of a pain. They’re 
also eroding to one’s health—in one study, nursing a grudge following a hurtful event led to 
stronger negative emotions, and increases in heart rate, skin conductivity, and blood pressure 
(Witvliet, Ludwig, & Vander Laan, 2001).  
However, one way that grudges can be significantly reduced is by attempting to make 
amends, and offering an apology (Darby & Schlencker, 1982). In one paper, Hannon and 
colleagues (2010) looked at a dyadic model of forgiveness in married partners following an act 
of betrayal. Similar to the moral dyad, one member of the couple was the perpetrator of the 
betraying act, and one member of the couple was the victim. In the first study, they found that 
when perpetrators made amends early on it was positively associated with victim forgiveness, 
suggesting that amends are crucial to the forgiveness process. In the second study, they found 
that both early perpetrator amends and subsequent victim forgiveness were associated with 
resolution of the betrayal event. Taken together, this paper suggests that both amends and 
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forgiveness strongly impact the extent to which a negative event between two people feels 
resolved.  
 In this study, I test the hypothesis that amends and forgiveness are also important factors 
in how individuals think about moral events from the perspective of the moral dyad. Specifically, 
I think that these two factors will be linked to how psychologically complete the moral event 
feels. I hypothesize that there will be a relationship between moral status (patient and agent) and 
psychological completeness; such that patients will feel that the event is less psychologically 
complete than will agents. I predict that this will be due to a significant difference between the 
extent to which patients feel like amends were made and the extent to which agents feel like 
amends were made. As shown in the previous chapter, patients feel that moral events are 
significantly more negative than agents, and are both easier to recall and more intense. As moral 
agents perceive the event to be less impactful, they may make fewer amends than patients think 
their behaviors merit. This may lead to a significant difference between patients and agents on 
the extent to which amends are perceived to have been made. I further predict that the extent to 
which amends were made will mediate the relationship between moral status and psychological 
completeness.  
Method 
100 participants (49 males, Mage=32.4, SDage = 11.65) were recruited from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk website, and were paid 50 cents for their participation.  
Materials and Procedures 
As in the previous studies, participants were again given a brief explanation of the moral 
dyad and the same examples. Following these examples, participants were randomly assigned to 
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either the moral agent condition or the moral patient condition. The memory prompt was slightly 
different than the one used in the previous studies: 
“Take a moment and think about a time when you were a Moral Patient/Moral Agent, a 
time when the actions or intentions of another person led to you being harmed/a time 
when your actions or intentions led to someone else being harmed. We would like you to 
recall a specific event in which you were a moral patient/moral agent. Make sure that 
the event is specific (it happened at a particular time and place, lasted less than one 
day).” 
All participants were given at least a minute to think and write about their recalled event.  
Following memory recollection, participants in both conditions were asked how long ago the 
event had occurred. Participants were also asked the following questions in randomized order:  
1) How much of an impact the event had on their lives on a scale from 1 (“The event has had 
very little impact”) to 7 (“The event has had considerable impact”), 2) How negative the event 
was, on a scale from 1 (“Not at all negative”) to 7 (“Extremely negative”), and 3) How 
intentional the agent’s behavior was, on a scale from 1 (“Not at all intentional”) to 7 
(“Extremely intentional”). In order to assess psychological completeness, participants were asked 
the following (adapted from Savitsky, Medvec, & Gilovich, 1997): 
“To what extent does the event in which you were a moral patient/moral agent feel 
psychologically incomplete? That is, if the event were a story, how unfinished does the 
story feel to you?” 
Participants responded on a scale from 1 (“This event feels like unfinished business”) to 7 (“This 
event feels like a closed book”). Following these questions, participants were also asked to 
indicate the extent to which the moral agent (or themselves) had attempted to make amends for 
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the event on a scale from 1 (“No amends were made”) to 7 (“Full amends were made”) and 
whether or not the moral patient (they) had forgiven the moral agent for the event by answering 
“Yes” or “No”.  
Results 
 There was no difference in how much time had elapsed since the event between patients 
(M = 3586.80 days SD = 6579.97) and agents (M = 5267.611 days, SD = 8487.79),  
t(98) = -1.09, p > .20. There was a marginal difference between patients (M = 3.71, SD = 1.99) 
and agents (M = 3.04, SD = 2.00) on how much of an impact the event had on their lives,  
t(98) = 1.693, p = .09.  
Negativity and intentionality. I replicated my previous findings, such that patients reported that 
the event was significantly more negative (M = 5.70, SD = 1.33) than agents (M = 4.78,  
SD = 1.54), t(98) = 3.162, p < .01. I also replicated the interaction between intentionality and 
moral status on negativity from Study 5 (this time with intentionality as a continuous variable), 
(b = -.44, SE = .15, p < .01). When participants view the behavior as intentional (1 SD above the 
mean), patients rated the event as significantly more negative than agents (b = -1.68, SE = .40,  
p < .0005). There was no effect of moral status on behaviors that were viewed as unintentional (1 
SD below the mean). 
Amends and Psychological Completeness. In line with my predictions, on the primary 
dependent variable of interest, psychological completeness, patients reported that the event was 
significantly less psychologically complete (M = 4.57, SD = 2.03) than agents (M = 5.59, SD = 
1.69), t(98)= -2.76, p < .01. In addition, patients reported that amends had been made to a 
significantly lesser extent (M = 2.00, SD = 1.69) than agents (M = 5.05, SD = 2.22), t(98) = -
7.63, p < .0005.  In order to test the prediction that the extent to which amends were made 
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mediates the relationship between moral status (moral agency and patiency) and psychological 
completeness, I conducted a mediational analysis (Hayes, 2013).  As seen in Figure 9, although 
moral status predicted both psychological completeness (b = 1.03, SE=.37, p < .01) and the 
extent to which amends were made (b = 3.05, SE=.40, p < .0005), the relationship between 
moral status and psychological completeness dropped to non-significance (b = .45, SE= p > .30) 
when controlling for differences in the extent to which amends were made. A bias-corrected 
bootstrap 95% CI indicated that the indirect effect through amends was significant, a ×b = .58, 
95% CI: [.10, 1.34].7 
 
Figure 9. The extent to which amends were made mediates the relationship between moral status 
and psychological completeness.  
Forgiveness. In addition, a significantly higher percentage of agents (46%) than patients (30%) 
recalled events in which forgiveness had occurred.  χ2 (1,100) = 5.43, p < .05. As predicted, there 
was a significant relationship between amends, forgiveness, and psychological completeness (see 
Table 2).  
                                                
7 For reverse mediation model, see Figure 16 in the Appendix. 
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Table 2: Psychological completeness and forgiveness (Study 7).  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Psych. Completeness -      
2. Amends .325** -     
3. Forgiveness8 .358** .447** -    
4. Impact -.232* .054 .051 -   
5. Agent Intent -.157 -.450** -.392** .016 -  
6. Negativity -.225* -.037 .050 -.529** .128 - 
 
Discussion 
 The results of this study show that, as predicted, there is a significant difference in 
psychological completeness between moral patients and moral agents, such that patients report 
that the event feels more unfinished than moral agents. Further, I show that this effect is 
mediated by the extent to which amends were made. What is perhaps most intriguing about these 
results may be the discrepancy in perceived forgiveness between patients and agents. This is 
likely related to the substantial discrepancy between patients and agents with regard to amends 
having been attempted. While agents recall events for which they have made moderate amends, 
patients recall events in which minimal to no amends were made. There are at least three 
potential explanations for this asymmetry: 1) As patients are the ones actually doing the 
forgiving, agents may lack true insight into whether or not forgiveness has occurred, 2) As 
patients generally report moral events to be more negative, there may be differences in terms of 
what degree of amends would need to be made to fix the situation, and 3) There may be 
                                                
8 Forgiveness was coded as Yes = 1 and No = 0.  
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differences in recall and retrieval, such that agents may be motivated to recall events in which 
they made amends and were forgiven, rather than events when they were not. In Study 8, I 
examine another potential contributor to psychological completeness, the extent to which causes 
for the event feel understood.   
Study 8: Causes and Completeness 
  When unexpected events occur, individuals unsurprisingly find themselves asking 
“why?”—we can’t help but wonder why the thief wanted our bike, why that painful breakup had 
to occur the way it did, and why the schoolyard bully picks on us in particular.  A vast amount of 
literature in social psychology has examined how we make attributions for the behavior of others 
and how we think about the causes of their actions (Heider & Simmel, 1944; Kelley, 1973; 
Helzer, 2012). Prior research has similarly focused on how we make causal attributions 
regarding our own behavior (Bem, 1967). Individuals are not always accurate when it comes to 
determining the origins of their behaviors, and may even take authorship for events in which they 
played no causal role (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Pronin et al., 2006).  
 This research suggests that determining the cause of another person’s—and sometimes 
even one’s own behavior—can be a difficult task. When it comes to moral events (i.e. those 
involving agents and patients) these attributions become very important when it comes to things 
like assessing moral character and responsibility. Across four studies, Pizarro and colleagues 
(2003) found that even when individuals intended to act immorally, caused the immoral event to 
occur, and the outcome was the planned one, moral blame was impacted by “causal deviance”, or 
unexpected changes in how intention and cause turn to outcome. As an example, consider the 
scenario below (from Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Bloom, 2003): 
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“Barbara wants to kill her husband, John. When they are eating at a restaurant, Barbara 
slips some poison into John’s dish while he isn’t looking. Unbeknownst to Barbara, the 
poison isn’t strong enough to kill her husband. However, it makes the dish taste so bad 
that John changes his order. When he receives his new order, it contains a food that John 
is extremely allergic to, and which kills him within minutes.” 
In this scenario, the agent has both the intention to kill her husband, and performed an action that 
she believed would lead to this desired outcome, which it does, but perhaps not in the way that 
she was expecting. Participants are sensitive to this distinction, and assigned Barbara 
significantly less moral responsibility for her husband’s death when it occurred in this fashion 
than in a scenario when the poison killed him outright. This suggests that knowledge of the 
causes of moral events, and how they relate to outcomes is very important when making 
assessments of moral responsibility and blame. 
 In the study below, I hypothesize that knowledge of the causes of moral events is also 
important when it comes to feeling like an event is psychologically complete. When we know 
why an event occurred, it provides a degree of understanding of the event that allows individuals 
to gain some sense of psychological closure. I further hypothesize that knowledge of causes will 
be one-sided with regard to the moral dyad, in particular, that agents will report that they have 
more insight into the causes of the event, and that this causal knowledge will lead to an increased 
feeling of psychological completeness. This prediction is somewhat complicated by the results of 
the prior study, which showed that amends mediate the relationship between moral status and 
psychological completeness. With this in mind I propose a model in which moral status’s effect 
on psychological completeness is mediated through both amends and causes, working in parallel 
(Figure 10).   
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Figure 10. Model of the proposed relationship between moral status and psychological 
completeness, with the extent to which amends were made and the extent to which causes were 
understood serving as mediators operating in parallel.  
Method 
Participants 
99 participants (60 males, Mage = 29.10, SDage  = 8.49) were recruited from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk website, and were paid 50 cents for their participation.  
Materials and Methods 
As in the previous studies, participants were given a brief explanation of the moral dyad 
and the same examples. Following these examples, participants were randomly assigned to either 
the moral agent condition or the moral patient condition. Participants were then shown the 
memory prompt used in Study 7 in which they recalled a specific moral agent or patient event. 
As in the previous study, all participants were given at least a minute to think and write about his 
or her recalled event.  
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Following memory recollection, participants in both conditions were asked how long ago 
the event had occurred. Participants were also asked the following questions in randomized 
order: 1) How much of an impact the event had on their lives on a scale from 1 (“The event has 
had very little impact”) to 7 (“The event has had considerable impact”), 2) How negative the 
event was, on a scale from 1 (“Not at all negative”) to 7(“Extremely negative”), 3) How 
intentional the agent’s behavior was, on a scale from 1 (“Not at all intentional”) to 7(“Extremely 
intentional”), and 4) The psychological completeness measure from Study 7, on a scale from 1 
(“This event feels like unfinished business”) to 7(“This event feels like a closed book”). 
Following this, participants also were asked the following questions in order assess the extent to 
which they understood the causes of the event:  
“To what extent do you feel like you understand the causes of this event? That is, how 
much do you feel that you understand why the event happened and the reasons for its 
occurrence?”  
Participants responded on a scale from 1 (“I do not understand the causes of this event at all”) to 
7(“I fully understand the causes of this event”).  
To assess the extent to which they understood the consequences of the event, participants were 
asked the following:  
“To what extent do you feel like you understand the consequences of this event? That is, 
how much do you feel that you understand how the event played out and the results of its 
occurrence?” 
Participants responded on a scale from 1 (“I do not understand the consequences of this event at 
all”) to 7(“I fully understand the consequences of this event”).  
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 Following these questions, participants were also asked to indicate the extent to which the 
moral agent (or themselves, if they were in the agent condition) had attempted to make amends 
for the event on a scale from 1 (“No amends were made”) to 7 (“Full amends were made”) and 
whether or not the moral patient (they) had forgiven the moral agent for the event by answering 
“Yes” or “No”.  
Results 
 There was no difference in how much time had elapsed (in days) since the event between 
patients (M = 3706.85 days, SD = 4672.55) and agents (M = 5346.70 days, SD = 7904.47), t(97) 
= -1.27, p > .20. There was a significant difference between patients (M = 3.90, SD = 2.00) and 
agents (M = 3.00, SD = 1.67) on how much of an impact the event had on their lives,  
t(97) = 2.43, p < .05.  
Negativity and Intentionality. Unlike in prior studies, I did not find a difference in reported 
negativity for the event, such that patients did not report that the event was significantly more 
negative (M = 5.19, SD = 1.65) than agents (M = 4.72, SD = 1.66), t(97) = 1.41, p = .16, though 
there is evidence of a trend in the direction consistent with previous studies. I replicated the 
interaction between intentionality and negativity from Studies 5 and 7, (b = -.61, SE = .16,  
p < .0005). When participants view the behavior as intentional (1 SD above the mean), patients 
rated the event as significantly more negative than agents (b = -1.28, SE = .42, p < .01). 
Unexpectedly there was also an effect of moral status on behaviors that were viewed as 
unintentional (1 SD below the mean), such that agents report unintentional behaviors as being 
less negative than patients (b = 1.20, SE = .48, p < .05).     
Causality and Psychological Completeness. In line with my predictions, on the primary 
dependent variable of interest, causality, patients reported that they understood the causes of the 
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event significantly less (M = 4.54, SD = 2.09) than agents (M = 5.98, SD = 1.33), t(97) = -4.04, 
p < .0005. There were no differences in how much patients reported understanding the 
consequences of the event (M = 5.67, SD = 1.26) than did agents (M = 5.98, SD = 1.33),  
t(97) = -1.17, p > .20. I also again found that patients reported that the moral agent made 
significantly less attempts to make amends (M = 2.85, SD = 2.16) than agents reported making 
(M = 4.47, SD = 2.46), t(97)=-3.41, p < .01. There was also a significant correlation between the 
extent to which causes are understood and the extent to which amends were made, r(99)=.30,  
p < .01. In order to test the prediction that the extent to which causes are understood mediates the 
relationship between condition (moral agency and patiency) and psychological completeness, I 
conducted a mediational analysis (Hayes, 2013).  As seen in Figure 11, although condition 
predicted both psychological completeness (b = .991, SE=.40, p < .05) and the extent to which 
causes were understood (b = 1.44, SE=.36, p < .001), the relationship between condition and 
psychological completeness dropped to non-significance (b = .28, SE=.38, p = .47) when 
controlling for differences in the extent to which amends were made. A bias-corrected bootstrap 
95% CI indicated that the indirect effect through understanding of causes was significant,  
a ×b = .72, 95% CI: [.28, 1.4].9 
                                                
9 For reverse mediation model, see Figure 17 in the Appendix. 
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 Figure 11. The extent to which causes feel understood mediates the relationship between moral 
status and psychological completeness.  
Forgiveness. The forgiveness results from study 7 also replicated, such that a significantly 
higher percentage of agents (87%) than patients (51%) recalled events in which forgiveness had 
occurred, χ2 (1,99)=14.33, p < .0001.  
Testing the proposed model. I ran a structural equation model examining the effect of moral 
status on psychological completeness through two mediators: the extent to which amends were 
made and the extent to which causes were understood. As seen in Figure 12, there was 
significant effect of moral status on the extent to which amends were made (b = 1.58, SE=.46, p 
< .005) and a marginal effect of amends on psychological completeness (b = .14, SE=.08,  
p = .06). A bias-corrected bootstrap 95% CI indicated that the indirect effect of moral status on 
psychological completeness through amends was significant, a ×b = .236, 95% CI: [.029, 1.42]. 
There was also a significant effect of moral status on the extent to which causes were understood 
(b = 1.44, SE=.35, p < .005) and of causes on psychological completeness (b = .45, SE=.13,  p < 
.005). In addition, there was also a relationship between amends and causes (b = .81, SE = .35, p 
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< .05). A bias-corrected bootstrap 95% CI indicated that the indirect effect of moral status on 
psychological completeness through the extent to which causes were understood was significant, 
a ×b = .642, 95% CI: [.231, 1.20]. As predicted, while the effect of moral status on psychological 
completeness was initially significant (b = .991, SE=.40, p < .05), after adjusting for amends and 
causes as mediating variables, the effect of condition on completeness dropped to non-
significance (b  = .06, SE=.38, p > .80). A bias-corrected bootstrap 95% CI indicated that the 
sum of the indirect effects through the extent to which amends were made and causes were 
understood was significant, a ×b = .226, 95% CI: [.411, 1.42]. 
 
Figure 12. Structural equation model examining the effect of moral status on psychological 
completeness through two mediators, the extent to which amends were made and the extent to 
which causes were understood (Note: Figure displays standardized betas).  
General Discussion 
 This chapter focused on the nature of the relationship between moral status on 
psychological completeness. In both studies, participants recalled either an event in which they 
had been a moral agent or a moral patient. As predicted, individuals who recalled times that they 
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had been moral patients indicated that the event felt more psychologically incomplete than 
individuals who recalled times that they had been moral agents. In study 7, the effect of moral 
status on psychological completeness was mediated by the extent to which amends were made. 
The goal of this study was to explore how a post-event factor (in this case, amends) impacted 
how agents and patients felt and thought about the moral event. The data from study 7 shows that 
the extent to which amends are made can powerfully influence both the likelihood of forgiveness 
and how individuals think about moral events in their lives. 
 Study 8 built on these results, and focused on the relationship of moral status on 
psychological completeness through two mediators operating in parallel: 1) the extent to which 
amends were made and 2) the extent to which causes of the event were understood. As agents 
have more insight into the underlying causes for their actions, and as moral agent’s actions are 
the catalysts for moral events, I hypothesized and found that participants who had recalled moral 
agent events indicated that they felt that they understood the causes behind the event 
significantly more than individuals who had recalled moral patient events. I proposed and tested 
a model wherein both amends and causes mediated the relationship of moral status on 
psychological completeness.  
The data indicate that the more that causes feel like they are understood and the more that 
amends are attempted to be made, the more psychologically complete moral events feel. As 
agents tend to both know the causes of moral events and control the extent to which amends are 
made, it is therefore unsurprising that they feel that events are more psychologically complete 
than moral patients do. For moral patients, who wonder about the causes and have to wait for an 
apology, these events may feel like an unfinished book—or perhaps, an un-ridden bicycle.  
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Chapter 5 
General Discussion 
 In Hinduism, there is a fable about six blind men who encounter an elephant. As each 
man feels a different part of the elephant, he cries out what he thinks the elephant is like. The 
man feeling the tusk claims that the elephant is a spear, and the man feeling the elephant’s leg 
loudly disagrees, and instead says that the elephant is a pillar10. The story is meant to illustrate 
that while both men were equally right—an elephant can feel like both a pillar and a spear—they 
were also equally wrong, as neither of those things are actually an elephant. Much like the men 
in the fable, moral agents and moral patients are limited to their own perspective when 
evaluating moral events in their lives. And thus, unsurprisingly, they run into the same 
problem—they are both equally right about what occurred from their perspective, but are perhaps 
equally wrong about the event as a whole.  
As the research presented above suggests, personal agency plays an important role in the 
perception of moral events. In Chapter 2, I showed that individuals tend to construe moral events 
at a higher level than non-moral events (study 1), but that this tendency is significantly reduced 
when they have performed the immoral act themselves (study 2). In these studies, participants 
identified immoral actions at either a higher (more abstract) level or at a lower (more concrete) 
level. In the first study, participants were presented with both immoral and non-moral behaviors, 
and were asked to indicate whether the high level or low level identification best described the 
actions. As predicted, participants indicated that high level identifications were better descriptors 
of immoral behaviors than of non-moral behaviors. In study 2, participants again selected 
whether a high or low level identification best described immoral behaviors, but this time, they 
                                                
10 For interested parties: The other four men claimed that the elephant was like a mud wall (for 
the skin), a serpent (for the trunk), a rope (for the tail) and a fan (for the ear).  
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also reported whether they had performed the act themselves. Prior agency was an important 
factor in action identification; such that individuals who had enacted the immoral behavior 
themselves were more likely to categorize it at a low level than those who had not. One reason 
for this pattern may be that identifying the action at a low level reduces the amount of valence 
and meaning associated with the immoral action. Immoral actions tend to be undesirable for 
those who have completed them, and one way that the negative emotions elicited by the 
performance of these actions may be dampened is by representing the action at a lower level, one 
that minimizes the evocation of moral standards.   
While a great deal of recent work in moral psychology has focused on the moral dyad  
(Gray & Wegner, 2009; Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012; Gray & 
Wegner, 2010), the research presented here is the first to show that theoretical predictions about 
the nature of the dyad play out in real-world moral situations. When moral events are split into 
those who do the harming (agents) and those who are harmed (patients) consistent memory 
effects emerge, such that moral patient memories are both more negative and more intense than 
moral agent memories.  
Chapter 3 focused on memory differences between agents and patients by having 
participants recall specific times in their lives when they have been in either moral role. In Study 
3, the results show that individuals can recall more autobiographical patient events than agent 
events. One reason for this may be that moral patient events are more emotionally negative than 
moral agent events. In Study 4, participants again recalled an event in which they were either an 
agent or a patient, assessed how negative the event was, and reported how many sensory details 
they could recall from the event. Patients recalled events that were more negative than those 
recalled by agents. Further, event negativity mediated the relationship between moral status 
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(agent/patient) and the number of sensory details recalled. Studies 5 and 6 expanded upon these 
results, and focused on the role that agent intentionality plays in both event negativity and 
memory recall. As previous research has shown that intentional harms are more painful than 
unintentional harms (Gray & Wegner, 2008) and study 4 showed that negativity leads to better 
memory for moral events, I predicted that agent intentionality would influence the relationship 
between moral status and memory intensity. In study 5, participants recalled an event in which 
they were either an agent or a patient, and the agent (or themselves) had acted intentionally or 
accidentally. As predicted, agent intentionality moderated the relationship between moral status 
and negativity, and moral status and memory intensity. Study 6 took this effect to the ballgame, 
and showed that when a pitcher was caught cheating in an actual major league game, the extent 
to which he was believed to have acted intentionally was associated with more accurate memory 
for the details of the game.  
Chapters 2 and 3 show that personal agency impacts both how moral events are 
perceived, and how they are recalled. Chapter 4 explored a possible mechanism behind these 
effects: psychological completeness. As agents are more in control of the moral events 
occurrence and of the extent to which amends are made, I predicted that agents would feel that 
the event was more psychologically complete, or finished, than would moral patients.  In study 7, 
participants again recalled an event in which they had been an agent or a patient, and also 
reported the extent to which the event felt psychologically complete, or closed. In addition, 
participants also reported the extent to which the agent (or themselves) had attempted to make 
amends for their behavior, and whether or not forgiveness had occurred. As hypothesized, agents 
reported that the event was significantly more psychologically complete than did patients, and 
this effect was mediated by the extent to which amends were made. Study 8 expanded upon these 
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results, and showed that psychological completeness is mediated by the extent to amends were 
made and the extent to which causes feel understood, operating in parallel. Taken together, these 
results suggest that an elephant is a heavy burden to carry, and it seems that patients are perhaps 
given the heavier psychological load.  
Do patients actually have a better memory for moral events? 
As summarized above, patient events are easier to recall than agent events, and are 
consistently reported to be both more negative and more intense than recalled agent events. 
However, if patients are more accurate in their memories for the events remains unknown. This 
speaks to a larger limitation and shortcoming of the studies above, specifically, that they are not 
working within a “closed system.” That is, the individuals who are recalling patient memories 
and the individuals who are recalling agent memories are likely not recalling the same events. 
This makes the accuracy of the recalled memories difficult to ascertain. Study 6 included a 
measure of overall memory accuracy, and showed that individuals who thought that the cheating 
pitcher (conceptualized as the moral agent) had acted more intentionally also had more accurate 
recall for the details of the baseball game. However, whether these individuals could really be 
considered “patients” is certainly up for debate. In addition, this study doesn’t include a measure 
of agent memory (as getting Michael Pineda to participate in a study about his cheating would 
likely be very difficult, and would result in a sample size of 1 in the agent condition).  
 Even within a closed system, memory accuracy for autobiographical events is 
remarkably difficult to determine, as memories can be changed and impacted by a variety of 
factors, including the words used to guide retrieval (Loftus & Palmer, 1974), whether or not 
more information is known about the situation in the present than was known in the past (Levine 
& Safer, 2002), and the goals and beliefs of the person in the present (Holland & Kensinger, 
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2011). For example, in one study, Safer and colleagues (2002) had students rate their test anxiety 
before a midterm exam and then recall their feelings one week later. The researchers found that 
how the student had performed on the test influenced memory for their pre-test anxiety, such that 
participants who had performed well on the exam (B and above) underestimated their pre-exam 
anxiety, whereas those who had performed poorly (B- and below) overestimated their pre-exam 
anxiety. Taken together, this suggests that there is something important to be gained in terms of 
understanding how individuals construct their life narrative by examining how they do it 
(McAdams et al., 2008), and not necessarily if it reflects reality.  
One possibility is that agents and patients do not necessarily recall the same details from 
the events. As shown in studies 4 and 5, patients are able to recall more sensory details and 
report that the memory is more intense than agents. However, sensory information and intensity 
could both be considered within the realm of “conscious experience”, a quality that defines 
patiency more than agency (Gray and Wegner, 2009). It may be that agents may remember more 
details about the mechanics of the event itself (what words were said, physical movements that 
were made). The results of study 2 are consistent with this hypothesis, as they show that moral 
agents are more likely to represent their immoral actions at a concrete or lower level. We thus 
might expect agents to have better recall for the concrete details of the event, and patients to have 
better recall for the event’s affective qualities.  
One limitation of the research above, is that the studies were run using Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk website, which allows for a more diverse study population, but makes it 
difficult to test these ideas within a closed system. Future work should examine the agent/patient 
dyad within a laboratory context in which agents and patients are recalling and perceiving the 
same moral event (e.g. an economic game or social rejection task), in order to explore whether 
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the effect of moral status on autobiographical memory is reflective of real biases in moral event 
memory. A more naturalistic way of approaching this issue would be to have individuals in pre-
existing dyads (e.g. siblings, romantic relationship partners) recall moral events like arguments 
or fights, in order to examine if the biases observed above emerge when individuals are recalling 
the same autobiographical event.  
Could patients have a worse memory for moral events? 
The research above indicates that patients recall events that are more negative and more 
intense than moral agents. Prior work has shown that emotional memories have a heightened 
sense of recollection, meaning that individuals hold very vivid memories for emotional 
experiences, and they feel very confident in these memories—even if the accuracy of these 
memories don’t match the confidence associated with their recall (Phelps & Sharot, 2008). There 
seems to be a rather large dissociation between belief that the memory is accurate and actual 
accuracy of the recalled memory (Sharot, Delgado, & Phelps, 2004; Sharot, Martorella, Delgado, 
& Phelps, 2007).  Some have found that aversive memories are less accurate, due to extreme 
emotion’s disruption of encoding (Kihlstrom, Beer, & Klein, 2003). Thus, while a patient may 
feel more confident in his or her memory due to its intensity, that does not necessarily mean that 
the memory is more accurate than the agent’s memory for the same event.  
Why are agent events more difficult to recall? 
In order to preserve a positive sense of self, individuals may engage in self-deception, or 
a motivated avoidance of negative information about the self. Over time, this leads to memory 
repression, or the development of a motivated inaccessibility for unpleasant or aversive 
memories or cognitions (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992). By failing to make associations between 
unpleasant events and pre-existing memory or knowledge networks, these negative events are 
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isolated, which reduces their likelihood of being attached to cues that could elicit memory recall 
(Hansen & Hansen, 1988). In addition, individuals engage in self-deception in order to ignore 
negative feedback while attending to positive feedback (Taylor and Brown, 1988). Individuals 
want to maintain their self-esteem, and isolating events in which they were a negative moral 
agent may be in the service of that goal.  
Though individuals often may consider themselves to be a certain way (e.g. smart, kind, 
funny), this sense of identity does not ring completely true until others have acknowledged it to 
be the case, in this way individuals gain a sense of identity via social reality (Gollwitzer & 
Wicklund, 1985). Thus, in order to achieve a sense of positive moral identity (e.g. that one is not 
a moral agent) an individual tells a narrative that leads others to recognize and endorse traits that 
he or she believes that they have (Baumeister & Newman, 1994). In the work presented above, I 
show that individuals may unknowingly construct these types of self-serving narratives for 
themselves, through biased memory processes that lead to diminished retrieval for moral agent 
events. However, while self-serving biases are undeniably involved, they are only part of the 
story. In study 3, participants recalled significantly fewer moral agent events than moral patient 
events over the same six-month time period. This may reflect a self-enhancement motivation—
individuals want to see themselves as good people, and good people don’t tend to be agents for 
negative moral events. However the order effect observed in study 3 suggests that this is not the 
only process at work in this effect.  
Shouldn’t agents feel pretty bad? 
As moral agents harm others, one might expect them to the wracked with guilt about their 
wrongdoings (Smith & Scherer, 1985). However, in the studies above, I find that agents report 
that moral events are less negative than do moral patients, and feel more psychological closure 
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for the event. However, this may not always be the case. Prior research (McGraw, 1987) showed 
that individuals experience more guilt when they have caused accidental harms as compared to 
intentional harms. In this study, participants were assigned to one condition of a 3 (role: 
harmdoer, victim, observer) x 4 (level of responsibility: accidental unforeseeable harm, 
accidental foreseeable harm, unjustified intentional harm, justified harm, and intentional harm). 
The researcher found that harmdoers assigned more responsibility to themselves than did the 
victim or observer, and that harmdoers reported feeling higher levels of guilt than victims or 
observers predicted that they would feel. Further, they found that harmdoers reported the most 
guilt when the harm had occurred accidentally than when it had occurred intentionally.  
The results of the studies above are inconclusive with regard to this question. In study 5, 
individuals were asked to recall events that in which they were either an agent or patient in a 
situation in which the agent (or themselves) had acted intentionally or accidentally. There was a 
significant interaction of moral status by intentionality, such that patients felt that the behavior 
was much more negative than did agents when the action was intentional, but that there was no 
difference between patients and agents when the action was accidental. If harmdoers feel worse 
about accidental behaviors than do victims (as suggested by the McGraw study) then we might 
expect agents to have reported that accidental harms were more negative than would patients.  
The results of study 7 are perhaps the best able to address this question. In this study, 
individuals recalled patient or agent events, and this time gave a continuous measure of both 
intentionality and negativity. When participants viewed the behavior as intentional (1 SD above 
the mean), patients rated the event as significant more negative than agents (b = -1.28, SE = .42, 
p < .01). There was also an effect of moral status on behaviors that were viewed as unintentional  
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(1 SD below the mean), such that agents report unintentional behaviors as being less negative 
than patients (b = 1.20, SE = .48, p < .05) (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 13. Perceived intentionality moderates the effect of moral status on event negativity.  
 These results indicate that agents think that the event is more negative than patients when 
the action was less intentional, but that this is not the case when the action is perceived as more 
intentional. While these results—paired together with those of study 5—are inconclusive in 
terms of the guilt that agents may feel, they underscore the idea that accidental behaviors are 
perhaps a different moral animal than intentional ones. While the reasons behind this effect are 
currently unclear, they may be due to a variety of factors. The methodology used in the studies 
above ask about the negativity of the event itself, and does not directly ask about guilt or post-
event feelings. It could be that discrepancies in the negativity of accidental moral events between 
harmdoers/victims (or agent/patient) arise in feelings that occur post-event. The event itself may 
be very negative (after all, a car that hits you accidentally still hurts a great deal), but the 
negative emotions following the event may be quite different if the action was accidental.  
 In addition, agents and patients may use different rules to determine moral blame when 
an action is accidental or intentional. As I have shown across multiple studies, patients report 
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that intentional actions are more negative than do agents. It could be that patients may rely on 
degree of intent as a heuristic for assigning moral blame, whereas agents may instead use the 
degree to which the outcome was unexpected. When an agent intentionally harms someone, they 
do so with a general prediction about how negative the outcome will be. However, when the 
action is accidental, this potentially creates a prediction error, such that the outcome is very 
different from what agents expected. This difference in outcome may lead to more guilt or 
negativity associated with accidental moral harms. Future work should focus more on the role of 
prediction error in the assessment of event negativity and moral harm.  
Are there more patients than agents? 
Another consideration might be that the results of study 3 are not indicative of any sort of 
self-deception at all—it’s entirely possible that there are fewer moral agents than moral patients. 
We can think of a multitude of examples where this might be the case: the Sandusky example 
mentioned in chapter 2, the Bernie Madoff case, any act of genocide. If we are willing to take a 
more abstract view of what constitutes a dyad, then we wouldn’t necessarily expect an even 
number of patients and agents. However, these explanations are probably unlikely for the data 
collected above, as we had participants report a word associated with the event, and by and large 
most involved acts that would largely function dyadically (e.g. “stealing”, “breakup”, “fight”).  
That said, this does not disqualify the larger point—individuals have a very good sense of 
when they were harmed, but may have less insight into when they harmed others. Another factor 
that may lead to a number discrepancy between agency and patiency may be how agents 
conceptualize their actions in terms of number harmed. For example, if one were to ask Jerry 
Sandusky about the events that transpired, he might only acknowledge the superordinate 
immoral action (child molestation) and not the number of people that had been harmed by his 
 80 
actions. This is partially because it is difficult to determine where to draw the line on who counts 
as a patient—undeniably all of the children harmed by Sandusky, but what about the football 
players who had their season cancelled? Or the Penn State fans and alumni who had their 
school’s reputation tarnished? In this case, the agent (Sandusky) might only be identifying one 
action, but that action impacted a number of different people in a multitude of different ways.  
In addition, agents may have less awareness about times that they have harmed others. There are 
a number of reasons to think that this might be the case, among them that high power individuals 
are both less cognizant of others’ emotions and experience less emotional reactivity (Galinsky, 
Magee, Inesi & Gruenfeld, 2006), and (as shown in chapter 2) when individuals have performed 
an immoral action themselves they are more likely to identify it at a lower level than if they 
hadn’t performed the action. Both of these factors may contribute to moral disengagement on the 
part of the moral agent, and perhaps a lack of awareness that a moral event even occurred.  
Could patients and agents be recalling different types of events? 
 As shown in chapters 3 and 4, moral patient events are easier to recall than moral agent 
events and are considered to be less psychologically complete. While I have focused on 
differences in recalled negativity between these two types of events, and knowledge of factors 
like causes and amends, left unexamined is the content of these memories. Two questions arise: 
1) are there differences between patients and agents in the emotional content of the recalled 
memories, and 2) are there differences between patients and agents in event severity? It could be 
that patients are recalling more emotional memories than are agents (differences in reported 
negativity would suggest that this is the case), and that agents are recalling more minor moral 
events than are patients.  
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Emotional content of recalled memories 
To examine the effect of moral status on emotional content, the recalled memories from 
studies 7 and 8 were submitted to Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC2007) content 
analysis (Pennebaker et al., 2007). LIWC counts the number of words used in a text sample that 
belong to different psychological categories (e.g. self-referential words, words that refer to 
positive emotions, words that refer to negative emotions), and reports these counts as a 
percentage of the total words used. That is, if 20 out of 200 words used in a recalled memory 
referred to negative emotion, the text would be given a score of 10 on the negative emotion 
dimension. Studies 7 and 8 were used because the memory prompts asked participants to write 
short responses, whereas in studies 3-5, participants only reported one or two words associated 
with the recalled event.  
 In study 7, there was a marginal correlation between reported event negativity and the 
proportion of negative emotion words used across both conditions (agent and patient), r(100) = 
.18, p = .07; however this was not the case in Study 8, r(98) = .03, p > .70. There was no 
difference between patients and agents in proportion of negative words used in study 7 ( p > .40) 
or in study 8 (p > .60). While there was a significant difference between patients (M = 1.03,  
SD = 1.43) and agents (M = 1.90, SD = 2.45), t(98) = -2.12, p < .05 in the number of positive 
words used, this was not the case in study 8 (p > .70). Taken together, these results are 
inconclusive with regard to answering the first question. While the data from study 7 is 
suggestive of a relationship between reported negativity and negative word content, this was not 
the case for study 8. In addition, there was no relationship between moral status and negative 
emotion words used. While there is perhaps an intriguing relationship between moral agency and 
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the number of positive emotion words used, this effect was not found across both studies. The 
inconsistency across studies may be due to the marginally larger responses elicited in study 7  
(M =47.95, SD = 26.98) as compared to study 8 (M =41.29, SD = 21.87), t (197) = 1.91, p = .06). 
Thus, while it seems that reported negativity might be related to the use of negative words, there 
do not appear to be consistent content differences between patients and agents in the use of 
negative words when recalling moral events.  
Differences in event severity of recalled memories 
It’s possible that agents may be recalling more minor events than patients, and that it is 
this discrepancy in event severity that is driving the difference in recall and reported 
completeness. In study 4, I showed that recalled patient memories are reported as being more 
negative than recalled agent memories—this could be due to a tendency for moral agent 
memories to be about less severe moral transgressions. If this is the case, it could be a reflection 
of a self-serving bias—when individuals are recalling times when they have harmed others, it 
might be less threatening to think about relatively minor harms. However, the results in chapter 2 
complicate this prediction. Once an immoral action has been performed, it is identified at a lower 
level. This potentially means that patients and agents could recall the same type of event (e.g. 
cheating), and describe it in ways that may differ in severity. Thus the event could be equally 
severe in identity, but not in description. Future work using content analysis will investigate 
whether there are systematic differences in the severity of the events recalled by patients and 
agents, and if the difference lies in the action itself, or in the description of the action.  
Negativity by any other name 
 It’s also possible that patients and agents may be conceptualizing negativity differently. 
Patients arguably have more access to what occurred after the event, and likely have more 
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residual negativity about the outcome of the event than do agents. Thus, when patients are asked 
about the negativity of the event, they may be incorporating post-event information to a greater 
extent than are agents. In contrast, when agents are considering event negativity, they may 
instead only be focusing on the outcome of the event, and not any residual negativity that the 
patient may have experience. This is, of course, speculative, but future work should examine if 
patients and agents are using the same time point when evaluating negativity of the event. If 
patients and agents are using different sources of information when arriving at their negativity 
assessments, this could complicate negativity’s role as a mediator in the effect of moral status on 
memory.  
Valence and arousal 
 A large limitation of the studies above is that they do not attempt to disentangle the roles 
of valence and arousal in the effect of moral status on autobiographical memory recall. While 
five of the studies measure event negativity, this term is a vague one—agents and patients may 
not only be recalling different things when arriving at their negativity assessments, but negativity 
as a concept potentially conflates the emotional dimensions of valence and arousal. Prior work 
has shown that it is arousal, and not valence, that facilitates memory retrieval (Talarico, LaBar, 
& Rubin, 2004; Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992). Further, negative valence can lead to 
the increased creation of false memories when arousal is held constant (Brainerd, Stein, Silveira, 
Rohenkohl, & Reyna, 2008).  
 It is possible that moral agents and moral patients may have different neural and 
physiological responses to the emotion-eliciting moral events, and that these responses may lead 
to the memory being better (or worse) recollected. Prior research in animals and humans has 
shown that highly emotionally arousing events lead to the release of adrenal stress hormones in 
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the amygdala, which facilitates memory consolidation (McGaugh & Roozendahl, 2002). 
Amygdala activation has also been shown to play an important role in both fear acquisition and 
fear extinction. Fear acquisition is linked to an increase in amygdala activation when a 
participant is presented with the conditioned stimulus, and a decrease in amygdala activation 
coupled with increased vmPFC activation when the conditioned response has been extinguished 
(Phelps, Delgado, Nearing, & LeDoux, 2004).  
 It’s possible that individuals who have been harmed (patients) experience more negative 
emotion and arousal during the moral event, leading to increased stress hormone production and 
amygdala activation. These may facilitate memory consolidation, leading to a more vivid 
recollection of moral patient events (compared to moral agent events) and increased amygdala 
activation or stress response upon recollection. Future work should examine neural and 
physiological differences between agents and patients when recalling the same moral event in 
order to get a better sense of the mechanisms underlying memory discrepancies between patients 
and agents. 
Applying social psychological theory to autobiographical memory 
 This research examined two theories in social psychology, action identification theory 
and dyadic morality, within the context of how individuals think about and remember moral 
events in their own lives. While previous work in action identification theory had made 
predictions about how experience performing an action may shape construal (Vallacher & 
Wegner, 2012), this research is the first to show intra-individual differences in action 
identification based on prior experience performing the action. Further, it builds on prior 
research showing that action construal is a motivated process (Maass et al., 1989), but extends 
this to the domain of the self.  
 85 
 While a great deal of recent research in moral psychology has focused on the moral dyad 
and mind perception as fundamental elements comprising human morality (Gray, Waytz, & 
Young, 2012), the majority of this research has focused on the evaluation of hypothetical 
scenarios that manipulate perceived agency or patiency by presenting participants with 
individuals that diverge in the two dimensions of mind perception. The previous work in mind 
perception has examined the extent to which we perceive agency and patiency in the evaluations 
of others, and how these dimensions can shifted based on their moral behaviors (Gray, Gray, & 
Wegner, 2007; Gray & Wegner, 2009). This research is the first to demonstrate that the 
agent/patient dyad can be applied to autobiographical moral events, and that the extent to which 
we perceive the qualities inherent in agency (i.e. the capacity to form intentions and act upon 
them) and patiency (i.e. the capacity to experience pain and suffering) in ourselves is dependent 
upon our role in the moral events that we have experienced.   
Conclusion 
Across eight studies, I have shown that the amount of agency that a person has in a moral 
event leads to predictable biases in how the event is perceived and recalled. These biases are the 
product of cognitive and motivational factors, which together lead to notable discrepancies in the 
recalled memories of those who did the harming and those who were harmed. Our recalled moral 
lives, instead of being perfect representations of the events that transpired, are perhaps instead 
the unchallenged accounts of our life story, adjusted and embellished to say what our most 
captive audience—ourselves—wants to hear. 
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APPENDIX 
Behavioral identification items from Study 1. Note: items are marked with an “H” to signify high 
level or with an “L” to signify low level.  
Original BIF Items: 
Making a list 
 Getting organized (H) 
 Writing things down (L) 
Measuring a room for carpeting 
 Getting ready to remodel (H) 
 Using a yardstick (L) 
Caring for houseplants 
 Watering plants (L) 
 Making the room look nice (H) 
Toothbrushing 
 Preventing tooth decay (H) 
Moving a brush around in one’s mouth (L) 
Paying the rent 
 Maintaining a place to live (H) 
 Writing a check (L) 
Immoral Identification Items: 
Cheating on a significant other 
  Hooking up with someone else (L) 
  Being unfaithful (H) 
Not correcting a cashier 
  Stealing from a business (H) 
  Keeping extra incorrect change (L) 
Looking off of someone’s test 
  Checking someone else’s answer (L) 
  Cheating on an exam (H) 
Ignoring a vegan friend’s dietary restrictions 
  Using chicken broth to make dinner (L) 
  Disrespecting a friend (H) 
Not giving a library book back 
Stealing from the library (H) 
  Keeping a book too long (L 
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Behavioral identification items from Study 2. Note: items are marked with an “H” to signify high 
level or with an “L” to signify low level.  
Cheating on a significant other 
  Hooking up with someone else (L) 
  Being unfaithful (H) 
Not correcting a cashier 
  Stealing from a business (H) 
  Keeping extra incorrect change (L) 
Looking off of someone’s test 
  Checking someone else’s answer (L) 
  Cheating on an exam (H) 
Ignoring a vegan friend’s dietary restrictions 
  Using chicken broth to make dinner (L) 
  Disrespecting a friend (H) 
Not giving a library book back 
Stealing from the library (H) 
  Keeping a book too long (L) 
Breaking an item that someone lent you 
  Damaging another person’s property (H) 
  Dropping something on the ground (L) 
Telling an inappropriate joke 
  Being offensive (H) 
  Making others laugh (L) 
 88 
Using your cell phone while someone is speaking 
  Being rude (H) 
  Checking your email (L) 
Hiring a friend or family member for a job 
  Acting unfairly (H) 
  Signing hiring forms (L) 
Using an expletive while speaking 
  Being inappropriate (H) 
  Speaking words (L) 
Ignoring a homeless person asking for money 
  Averting your eyes (L) 
  Not helping someone in need (H) 
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Table 3: Item by item analysis for the behavioral identification items from Study 2.  
Item M-level M-experience Level-exp. r Item-total r 
Cheating on a significant other .80 .22 -.33* .11 
Not correcting a cashier .67 .39 -.37** .35 
Looking off of someone’s test .88 .51 .01 .32 
Ignoring friend’s dietary restrictions .75 .10 -.56** .45 
Not giving a library book back .75 .18 -.08 .55 
Breaking item someone lent you .84 .35 .09 .20 
Telling an inappropriate joke .71 .69 -.25 t .53 
Using phone while someone is speaking .96 .59 -.17 .38 
Hiring friend or family for a job .53 .25 .01 .25 
Using an expletive while speaking .63 .86 -.07 .31 
Ignoring homeless person .59 .88 .07 .36 
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Memory Items from Study 6. Note that the correct answer is bolded. 
1) Where was the game played? 
a. Yankee Stadium 
b. Fenway Park 
c. I don’t remember 
2) Who was the starting pitcher for the Red Sox? 
a. Clay Buchholz 
b. John Lackey 
c. Jon Lester 
d. Jake Peavey 
e. I don’t remember 
3) Who was the starting pitcher for the Yankees? 
a. Michael Pineda 
b. Hiroki Kuroda 
c. CC Sabathia 
d. Masahiro Tanaka 
e. I don’t remember 
4) At the bottom of the first inning, Red Sox second baseman Dustin Pedroia singled to center 
field, hitting in a scoring run. Who scored on this play? 
a. Mike Napoli 
b. David Ortiz 
c. Grady Sizemore 
d. Mike Carp 
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e. I don’t remember 
5) How many runs did the Yankees score in the top of the second inning? ___________ 
(Correct answer = 1) 
6) In what inning was the Yankees pitcher ejected for using pine tar? __________ 
(Correct answer = 2nd inning) 
7) Where was the pine tar discovered on the pitcher’s body? _________ 
(Correct answer = neck) 
8) Has this pitcher gotten into trouble for using pine tar before? 
a. No, he had never used pine tar before.  
b. Yes, he has used pine tar before. 
c. I don’t remember. 
9) At the top of the 6th inning, Yankees left fielder Alfonso Soriano hit a sacrifice fly to right 
field, hitting in a scoring run. Who scored the run on this play? 
a. Carlos Beltran 
b. Jacoby Ellsbury 
c. Mark Texeira 
d. Derek Jeter 
e. I don’t remember. 
10) Who was the closing pitcher for the Red Sox? 
a. Chris Capuano 
b. Edward Mujica 
c. Andrew Miller 
d. Koji Uehara 
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e. I don’t remember. 
11)  Who was the closing pitcher for the Yankees? 
a. Shawn Kelley 
b. Matt Thornton  
c. Andrew Warren 
d. David Robertson 
e. I don’t remember 
12) What was the outcome of the game? 
a. The Red Sox won. 
b. The Yankees won. 
c. I don’t remember. 
13)  What was the final score of the game? 
a. Number of runs scored by the Red Sox: _________ (Correct answer = 5) 
b. Number of runs scored by the Yankees: _________ (Correct answer = 1) 
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Figures 14-17. Reverse mediation models for studies 4, 7, & 8.  
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